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Abstract 
The concept of a Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) is an attractive, yet ambiguous one. It is 
a mechanism that has been widely welcomed and used to address huge infrastructure gaps and 
to reduce excessive government roles in public infrastructure development and provision in 
Mongolia. However, issues related to qualities of PPPs, fiscal problems, corruption, social 
disapprovals, manipulation - i.e. unknown risks - that are harmful to the society, have started to 
come up after 7 years of experience of actively promoting the PPP system.  
This paper based on empirical and comparative analyses, discusses that, the main causes 
of failures of PPPs have been that: 1) the flexibility and ambiguity of the PPP concept is not 
balanced against its accountability and efficiency; 2) that there is a lack of political will to nurture 
genuine partnership and a lack in the capability of the public sector; and 3) an uncompetitive 
private sector and immature environment. These factors have together created the 
maneuvering space for the manipulation of the PPP concept, its types, applicable infrastructures, 
institution as well as combined to promote fake procurement, management, economic analysis 
of PPPs, tendering, in general artificially legitimizing distorted partnerships in Mongolia. 
These distortions have enabled PPPs to be used in a socio-economically unbalanced way 
and have influenced the promotion of PPPs in an inefficiently allocative way at the expense of 
public interest. To eliminate confusions, instabilities and opportunisms within the PPP system, 
the paper proposes several must-implement policy recommendations by comparing the failure 
factors of Mongolian PPPs with success factors of the Republic of Korean PPPs. These are: to 
clarify all the existing confusions, to promote the check and balance mechanisms along with a 
fiscal safeguarding measures of various budget ceilings approaches, to enhance the 
accountability mechanism that is based on performance indicators for both public and private 
sectors as well as to shift from the ‘artificial’ PPPs procurement practice to the ‘proper’ and 
competitive procurement practice by taking various state-led deliberate measures. The paper 
concludes that if Mongolia could not take at least these must-implement measures, the PPP 
system might more harm the public interest than benefit it, due to the nature of infrastructure 
PPPs that are prone to rents.   
Key words: Public-Private-Partnership, causes of PPPs failures, success and failure factors, public 
interest  
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Introduction 
Background and problem definition 
As a typical representative of a developing country, Mongolia faces a huge 
infrastructure gap due to increased urbanization, industrialization and population development 
but a financial shortage to fill it. In that vein, PPPs have become the main solution to that. 
However, recently the efficiency and accountability of PPPs have been questioned due to 
several serious problems mentioned below.  
The Parliament of Mongolia approved the Resolution on the Resignation of the Prime 
Minister J.Erdenebat and his leading Government in September 2017. This Government was 
selected and formed after the Parliamentary Election in 2016 and the resignation happened 
only after one year. One of the main reasons or as according to media information, could be 
said that there was an illegality of concession agreements which had conflicts of interests. 
Mainly, MNT 60 billion of concession agreements had been given to ministries, with further 
concessions given to people with conflicts of interest. According to Parliament Member Mr. 
B.Purevdorj, one concession was given to a company called “Zasag Chandmani Mins” whose 
owner has a conflict of interest, to build a paved road of more than 100 km from the mining site 
to the border of the Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as China) for the transportation 
of iron ore to China in 2017. The Parliament member further claimed that “…this paved road is 
not widely used by the ordinary people as well as does not have any social, industrial and 
economic importance for a society as a whole, but for the mining company” (Video by 
news.zasag.mn, 2017). On the other hand, the Head of the PPP Unit of the National 
Development Agency Mr. O.Munkhtur, officially said that, “…this road has been decided to be 
built through the concession contract, because the mining companies together proposed to 
build this road by their own expense and investment (Interview with the Head of PPP Unit of 
the National Development Agency Mr. O.Munkhtur, news.mn, 2017). In 2017, Mongolia 
received an IMF debt package and in connection to that, the IMF required the GOM to conduct 
an audit of PPPs due to PPPs’ potential for a high level of burden on the budget. Moreover, 
there have been various media news and public disapproval concerning the low quality of new 
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paved roads that were built through concession agreements. Overall, it could be understood 
that issues related to qualities of PPPs, fiscal problems, social disapprovals, manipulation - i.e. 
unknown risks - that are harmful to the society have started to come up after 7 years of 
experience in actively promoting the PPP system in Mongolia.  
Purpose and research questions 
In general, the use of PPPs has been accepted as a panacea at the introduction of the 
PPP system in Mongolia due to the various government failures and negative attitudes of the 
private sector concerning too much government intervention in a market economy. Currently, 
there are issues concerning PPPs in Mongolia because of various scandals related to rent 
seeking, budget problems and qualities on the one hand, and huge infrastructure gaps and 
financial incapability of the government to effectively handle the issues on the other hand. 
Consequently, the main purpose of the study is to clarify the inherent problems that have 
caused the failures of PPPs in Mongolia.  
In line with that, the main research question would be: What have been the main 
causes of failures of PPPs in Mongolia? What have been the most vital aspects that have 
negatively influenced the PPPs’ performance and inefficiency of management?  Various sub-
research questions are also contemplated and asked, in order to better understand and reason 
out the main research questions, such as what are the failure factors behind these problems; 
how and why have these failures occurred?; and what conducive factors and situations have 
influenced the occurrence of the failures of PPPs in Mongolia?   
Thesis hypothesis 
In response to the research questions – “What have been the main causes of failures of 
PPPs in Mongolia? What have been the most vital aspects that have negatively influenced the 
PPPs’ performance and inefficiency of management?”, this paper predicts that the highly 
complex and ambiguous nature of PPPs have led to political and private parties taking 
advantage, which has further led to socio-economically unbalanced PPP practices that were 
detrimental to the public interest in Mongolia.  
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Contributions and limitations 
The current literature both in English and Mongolian greatly ignores empirical and 
normative analyses of causes of failures of Mongolian PPPs. Therefore, a narrower analysis of 
the failures, ground causes of failures and recommending principle directions and discussions 
would help to make a considerable contribution to improve the PPPs system of Mongolia.  
  Moreover, this paper contributes to the existing literature on experiences with PPPs of 
developing countries, by focusing on the Mongolian case for evidence-based learning. 
Importantly, the paper could have implications for other developing countries to formulate 
factors that could influence the performance of their own PPPs since the paper compares and 
analyzes the failure factors of Mongolian PPPs from a developing country perspective, using the 
success factors of Korean PPPs from a developed country perspective in a context-driven and 
analytic way. Finally, currently due to the globalization of the PPP market, this paper is crucial in 
enabling further research to be made from a cross-country perspective as well as to enable 
international PPP players to be informed of the risks, challenges, problems and opportunities in 
the contexts of Mongolian PPPs.  
The monitoring and evaluation of PPPs has so far, not been conducted, nor has an 
integrated database for PPPs been created since the implementation of the PPP system. 
Consequently, the main limitation of the paper is that there is a limited analysis driven by the 
lack of data and evaluation reports about PPPs in Mongolia. It should be also mentioned that 
the relevant parts that define the costs, investments and fees of PPPs have been omitted from 
the publicly-available concession contracts, which has greatly hindered making a proper 
quantitative analysis of individual as well cumulative projects. This issue of lack of transparency 
should be addressed for better accountability and monitoring from independent scholars, 
researchers and the civil society.   
Methodology 
This paper uses research methods, such as empirical analysis, case analysis, comparative 
and deductive analysis, document analysis in order to develop reasonable comments and 
conclusions for the proper PPP system and practice in Mongolia. The discussion of the 
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theoretical foundation for the paper mostly relies on the relevant scholarly literature and case 
studies.  
The part on the identification of failure factors of PPP practice is based on descriptive 
statistics, PPPs contracts, various government reports, media and yellow news. Also, more 
specific comparative case, legal and policy-based, institutional, procurement and fiscal 
framework analyses of the South Korean success factors and Mongolian failure factors are 
made to help for better understanding of the causes of failures and gaps in PPPs policies in 
Mongolia. This comparison is done to the extent to emphasize the gaps in Mongolia and the 
differences in contexts, but does not attempt to cover the PPP system in Korea in descriptive or 
critical ways. Finally, the paper would conclude and provide recommendations on the future 
direction of PPP policy in Mongolia.  
Expected outcome 
Based on the comparative analysis and scholarly literature, a recommendation would be 
proposed regarding the proper measures to take in order to address the current failure factors. 
This would help create a better PPP policy that is suitable for the level of social and economic 
development of Mongolia. 
Composition of the paper 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section I provides the existing 
literatures on the infrastructure PPPs around the world, specifically evaluation of 
implementations, identified failure and success factors. 
Section II provides general information about Mongolia that should be taken in to consideration 
in the development of a proper PPP system as well as briefly provides information on the 
infrastructure gap and current financial incapability of Mongolia, as rationales for implementing 
an effective PPPs system in Mongolia.  
Section III makes statistical, document, contracts and yellow news analyses to reveal the failure 
factors behind PPP practices. 
Section IV focuses on comparative case, policy and legal, institutional, procurement and fiscal 
analyses in the framework of Korean success factors and Mongolian failure factors in order to 
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create the basis for understanding the causes of failures of PPPs in Mongolia for further policy 
recommendations. 
Section V summarizes key causes of context specific failures for Mongolia and proposes 
recommendations and future perspectives of the PPP policy in Mongolia. 
Section VI reflects the limitations of the paper. 
Literature review on rationales, success and failure factors of 
PPPs 
The literature review concentrates on existing research concerning analysis of rationales, 
criticisms of PPPs and critical analyses of experiences of PPPs in different contexts with the 
focus of failure and success factors of PPPs implementation. Also, the literature review briefly 
reviews the success factors behind PPPs in Korea specifically. At the end of the section, a 
literature review of PPPs solely for Mongolia is elaborated. In that way, theoretical and practical 
backgrounds are analyzed, which would further enable a critical analysis of causes of failures of 
PPPs in Mongolia to be made.   
Rationales and criticisms of PPPs 
The rationale behind the use of PPPs are based on various economic theories and 
practical justifications such as meta-theories; government regulation of business theory; 
regional and urban dynamics theory; public choice theory; principle agent theory; NPM; 
economics of collaborative behavior; learning and dynamic capabilities; concepts of relational 
contracting from transaction cost economics; complex adaptive systems perspective; resource 
dependency perspective; and neo-institutional theory etc. where the main conceptual bases 
and normative rationales of use of PPPs are increased efficiency over the life cycle of the 
project and enhanced social welfare (Ball, R., 2009; Carmeli et all., 2006; Child, 2005; 
Christensen, 2007; Flinders, 2006; Rosenau, 2000, Graeme A Hodge et all., 2010; Henry A Davis, 
2008; Stefano Gatti, 2008; World Bank, 2004, 2006, 2009, 2011; OECD, 2009; IMF, 2008). 
Particularly, the 1980s’ insights of NPM has shifted the government responsibility to a 
more managerial direction by intensifying the use of market and quasi-market competition 
mechanisms; and by unbundling public services, so that only the ‘public interest’ component of 
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services could remain for public authorities; but that the other components could be provided 
by the competitive and innovative private sectors for the sake of improving quality of services 
and reducing costs. By bringing various groups that have mutual goals together and by enabling 
them to deal efficiently with complex problems as a single decision-making entity, PPPs could 
internalize externalities and reduce transaction costs between their activities and achieve more 
added value, which should to a sufficient extent, attract the interests of public and private 
sectors.  
Moreover, PPPs enable projects to have a single point of responsibility and this is a 
strong feature of PPPs in delivering better accountability, especially for large projects. Grimsey 
and Lewis emphasized that accountability and a regard for the public interest are most 
important as they assist in legitimizing and acceptance of contractual arrangements. They 
investigated the PPP relationship and concluded that a high dependency makes the risk of 
opportunistic behaviors problematic and challenging. Also, Erik-Hans Klijin expressed 
managerial efforts make a PPP work more efficiently rather than through an organizational 
form (Graeme A Hodge et all., p.77, 2010). Indeed, increased information-sharing among PPP 
project teams makes projects more flexible to changing business environments. For instance, 
PPP contracts usually last 20-30 years; in that way private parties have incentives to come up 
with more innovative designs, use more sustainable materials for construction and make the 
maintenance less costly and profitable. Consequently, efficiency increases for both building and 
operating the PPP more under the use of bundling than unbundling, leading to higher social 
welfare.  
From a practical stand-point the following advantages of PPPs have been highlighted: 
PPPs are technically efficient; PPPs are able to take advantage of economies of scope since 
activities are bundled together; PPPs are able to postpone government cash outlay at least in 
the short-run since a government is able to pay a relatively small part of the cost upfront; the 
use of PPPs may improve governments’ net cash flow; users are more willing to pay a toll or at 
least a higher toll to a private sector than to a government - although this may be costly as 
governments would be transfering risks to the private sector -; better punctuality and on 
budget delivery; political risk may be lower with PPPs since risks related to construction cost 
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overruns are transferred to private sectors and other similar factors. (Ball, R., 2009; Carmeli et 
all., 2006; Child, 2005; Christensen, 2007; Flinders, 2006; Rosenau, 2000, Graeme A Hodge et 
all., 2010). 
Critiques of PPPs 
Various criticisms from political economy, governance, postmodern theory and public-
sector accounting perspectives concerning PPPs have been raised, such as those stating that 
PPPs have brought about debt that has to be paid by future generations. In some instances, a 
VfM assessment favors private finances especially when ‘arm’s length’1 organizations lack; the 
appraisal process undermines transaction and externality costs; PPPs reduce governments’ 
policy flexibility through long-term contractual obligations; the monopolistic character of long-
term contracts are against market ideology; incomplete contracts could take place where 
parties may behave strategically to the benefit of themselves; unbundling does not necessarily 
lead to efficient outcomes due to profit-seeking private parties and public sector players with 
unclear motives; the issue of an improper discount rate application may occur; there is a 
possibility of ruling out SMEs as well as third parties due to the front-loaded high bid prices - 
although risks are transferred to the private sector -; the government should pay high risk 
adjustment costs and other similar reasons such as where the main argument is PPPs are not 
panacea, but PPPs are a very complex phenomenon and there are ‘no free lunches’ when it 
comes to PPPs (PPIAF, 2014; Hodge, 2004; Shaoul, J et all., 2008; Shaoul, J et all., 2008; Heller, 
Pete, 2005; World Bank, 2004, 2006, 2009, 2011; NAO, 2007a, b; Graeme A Hodge et all., 2010; 
Henry A Davis, 2008; Stefano Gatti, 2008). 
PPPs in different contexts: success and failure factors of PPPs 
In general, PPPs have been considered as a more novel and efficient way of delivering 
public services and infrastructures in comparison to other traditional approaches all around the 
world (Fobil et al., 2008; Miraftab, 2004; Ke, 2014). The studies that concern the most recent 
international experiences of PPPs concluded that PPPs have already become the part of the 
                                                 
1 In this paper, ‘arm’s length’ generally refers to an independent, check and balance institution. For more 
information: Harry Hillman Chartrand & Claire McCaughey, The arm's length principle and the arts: an 
international perspective - past, present and future, American Council for the Arts, N.Y.C, 1989. 
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government policy and the key institutional form for the cooperation of the public and private 
sectors around the world during the last few decades (Graeme A Hodge et all., 2010). 
Particularly, PPPs have been extensively used in developing countries than in developed 
countries, to help with reducing infrastructure gaps, poverty and promoting socio-economic 
growth (Harris. C, 2003; Graeme A Hodge et all., 2010).  
Nevertheless, less than impressive initial empirical results have expressed caution 
towards PPPs, thus different criticisms concerning PPPs have been actively raised not only in 
developing but also in developed countries based on the recent experiences of PPPs (PPIAF, 
2014; Hodge, 2004; Shaoul, J et all., 2008; Shaoul, J et all., 2008; Heller, Pete, 2005; World Bank, 
2004, 2006, 2009; 2011; OECD, 2009; IMF, 2008; NAO, 2007a, b; Graeme A Hodge et all., 2010). 
Particularly, there are concerns about the actual financial sustainability of PPPs in various 
contexts in the medium to long-term due to the current short-term oriented fiscal analysis of 
PPPs.  
Dr. Paul Noumba-Um concluded based on the PPPs experiences of developing countries: 
“PPPs face a wide variety of obstacles in developing countries. These range from a weak policy 
and regulatory environment; lack of a pipeline of viable and bankable projects; and weak 
capacity of public institutions to process PPPs; underdeveloped domestic financial and capital 
markets. In general, establishing a robust PPP policy and legal framework has proven to be 
challenging in most countries as it entails in-depth institutional reform in the way government 
operates and performs. In many countries in the developing world, there remains a gap between 
written policies and enacted legislations, and their implementation or enforcement on the 
ground.” 
 
Further “…First, in many cases governments failed to understand that not all of their 
infrastructure projects should be undertaken as PPPs. ...Third, in many cases, unfortunately, 
governments failed to ensure consistency between their capital development programs in 
infrastructure and the pipeline of PPP projects…”. 
Source: (Graeme A Hodge et all., p.470, 2010) 
In developing countries, the implementation of PPPs has not been successful in all 
instances (Sirtaine et al., 2005). In addition, there have been various failure cases in developed 
countries (Soomro and Zhang, 2013; Tam, 1999; Kumaraswamy and Zhang, 2001; Monsalve, 
2009; Liu et al., 2016, Graeme A Hodge et all., 2010). Although, the failure factors have differed 
to some extent in both developed and developing countries, the following failure factors of 
PPPs could be summarized: there is a weak institutional structure and human capacity; a lack of 
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proper support from government authorities; a lack of transparency and accountability; 
opportunism corruption, high level of rent-seeking behaviors; a lack of competitiveness or 
lengthy bidding process; a lack of coordination; a low level of public interest behind project 
decisions; huge rents for private operators; a complexity of lengthy contracts and negotiation; 
delayed finalization of contracts and negotiation;  a problem of asset-currency mismatch; a lack 
of sophisticated equity and debt financing markets for long-term equity and debt financing 
needs; excess high level of use of unsolicited projects and so on. (Lossa and Martimort, 2013, 
2015; Hoppe and Schmitz, 2013, Graeme A Hodge et all., 2010; Guillermo Takano, 2017).  
A series of factors required for successful PPPs 
Based on a thorough review of earlier literature, Osei-Kyei et al. developed a 
comprehensive set of criteria for measuring PPP project success (Osei-Kyei et al., 2017). These 
factors contributing to successful PPPs are as summarized below:   
Table 1 Criteria for measuring a PPP project success 
Success Criteria Descriptions 
Profitability  A continuous income/profit is received by parties during project operation 
Long-term relationship and 
partnership 
Cordial relationship and well-established coordination are instituted among 
stakeholders. 
Satisfying the need for public 
facility and/or service 
An implemented PPP project fully satisfies the need for a public facility 
and/or service. 
Adherence to time Project is constructed on and/or before time schedule for commissioning. 
Adherence to budget Project is constructed according to the estimated cost and is without any 
operational cost overruns. 
Reduced litigations and 
disputes 
Contract litigations and disputes are minimized throughout the project life 
cycle. 
Reduced public sector 
administrative cost 
Lower cost is incurred by the public sector in the administration of the project 
because major project risks are allocated to the private sector. 
Effective technology transfer 
and innovation 
Technical knowledge and innovation are effectively shared among 
stakeholders, particularly with local practitioners. 
Local economic development The project contributes to the economic development of the community 
within which the project is developed. 
Environmental performance  The project does not affect the health and safety of residents or the 
environment. 
Reduced project life cycle cost Lower life cycle cost is realized, which enhances the project’s value for the 
money. 
Reliable and quality service 
Operations 
Continuous and uninterrupted project services are provided and according to 
the satisfaction of users. 
Meeting output specifications The project meets the expected output standards and/or requirements and 
delivery. 
Effective risk management Risks are properly identified. The risk sharing and transfer mechanisms are 
agreed on and effectively implemented by the public and private parties. 
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Reduced public and political 
Protests 
There are reductions in agitation and protests, which often arise due to 
increases in tariffs, lack of transparency, corruption, and so forth. 
Source: Osei-Kyei et al., 2017 
Moreover, 14 critical success factors have been determined based on an empirical study 
conducted in Nigeria. These are: government involvement by providing guarantees; political 
support; competitive procurement process; transparency in the procurement process; 
availability of suitable and adequate financial market; project economic viability; commitment 
and responsibility of public and private sectors; appropriate risk allocation and risk sharing; 
appropriate project identification; technical innovation and technology transfer; thorough and 
realistic assessment of the cost and benefits; project technical feasibility; strong and good 
private consortium; and favorable legal framework (Solomon Olusola Babatunde, 2015). 
Also, scholars extensively mention the following detailed failure factors and key 
measures to prevent problems in developing countries for PPP procurement.  
Table 2 Key measures to prevent failures for PPP procurement in developing countries 
Planning stage An inadequate feasibility study, distorted risk sharing 
Revenue and cost estimates An improper or lack of detailed financial and economic analysis, 
inadequate forecasting demands 
Compliance with contractual 
agreement 
Both government and private sector compliance  
Strong institutional 
arrangements 
A lack of coordination between public organizations, between public and 
private sectors, unclear or unsustainable rules and regulations that 
increase transaction costs and information asymmetries, unskilled human 
resources 
Value of competitive 
procurement 
A lack of competitive bidding which enables the private sector to take 
advantage of its position 
Source: Graeme A Hodge et all., p.543, 2010 
 
Overall, it could be understood that on the one hand, there are still so many challenges 
and problems that could easily lead to failure of PPPs and, on the other hand, creating an 
environment for successful implementation of PPP policy is a challenging task. Specifically, in 
developing countries, not only multi-dimension, multi-stakeholder and multi-level efforts and 
measures need to be taken, but also that there needs to be the nurturing of well-established 
institutions, social and human capitals for a PPP policy to be successful.  
Success factors of the Republic of Korean PPPs system 
The PPP market of the Republic of Korea has over 20 years of experience and now the 
country has become one of the most advanced countries with a stable and highly profitable PPP 
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market (Jay-Hyung Kim et all., 2011; Kangsoo Kim, 2017). The following were mentioned as 
success factors: solid foundation of legal and institutional system; elaborated analytical tool and 
implementation guidelines; fair and transparent procurement system; and mature PPP projects 
market (Kangsoo Kim, 2017).  
Here it must be mentioned that social capital, institutions, unwritten norms are critical 
in order for a collaboration between public and private sectors to be successful. For instance, 
Chris Skelcher claims “…societal norms and the underling attitudes towards the way in which 
business should be conducted are important determinants” for successful collaboration. As an 
outstanding example could be Hong Kong’s great urban projects where the solidity and success 
depend on not only on their written norms and official institutions but also their interpersonal, 
inter-organizational and institutional embeddedness (Graeme A Hodge et all., 2010). Basically, 
it is claimed that, a collaboration based on more reliable governance structures and processes 
might significantly improve the efficiency of the overall production system. These findings 
critically indicate the importance of contexts for a successful partnership to take place between 
the public and private sectors.  
Table 3 General facts of the Republic of Korea and Mongolia  
Indicators as of 2016 The Republic of Korea Mongolia 
Population  51.245.707 3,081,677 
Territory  100,210 km2 (38,690 sq mi) 
(107th) 
1,566,000 km2 (605,000 sq mi) 
(18th) 
Density 507/km2 (1,313.1/sq mi) (23rd) 1.97 /km2 (5.1/sq mi) (238th) 
GDP USD 1.411 Trillion USD 11 Billion   
GDP per capita USD 27533.3 USD 3660 USD 
Current account balance USD 98,677,400 Billion USD -948,455,402 (2015) 
HDI (2015)   0.901 very high – 18 th 0.735 high – 92nd 
Unemployment % total  3.7% 7.45% (2015) 
Source: World Bank, World Economic Outlook Database; K-Developedia, Key development data for Korea, 2017   
In that vein, it should be emphasized that, in addition to formal PPP success factors, in 
Korea, the necessary social capitals and culture have been nurtured in the past through its rich 
history, culture, and well-developed public policies. Korea has not only already well-developed 
fundamental infrastructure such as the accumulation of human and material capitals, but also 
the embedded, accountable, vision oriented state and well-developed mechanisms of 
collaboration with market players (Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1996; Danil Rodrik, 2008). Therefore, a 
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very careful consideration of contexts is required for a comparative policy analysis of PPPs of 
two countries, due to the relative immature socio-economic environment and low social capital 
of Mongolia. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 A short SWOT analysis of PPPs market in Mongolian context   
STRENGTHS 
 A fast-growing economy due to the growing 
export of natural resources  
 A favorable policy and legal environment for 
the support of private sector participation in 
the infrastructure development 
 A favorable and stable legal environment for 
foreign investment and companies  
 Low input and labor costs  
 A growing competitive private sector 
 A high level of political will to reduce huge 
infrastructure gaps  
WEAKNESSES 
 Lack of proper knowledge about PPPs  
 Lack of incapable public and private sectors 
 Lack of financial ability of public and private 
sectors 
 Lack of technological innovation 
 Lack of institutional stability and 
accountability mechanism 
 Lack of political embeddedness 
 Lack of development of financial markets 
 Lack of implementation of laws  
 Lack of social capitals 
OPPORTUNITIES 
 A high willingness of the Government to  
support the participation of the private 
sector in the infrastructure development 
 A high and urgent demand for various kinds 
of economic and social infrastructures 
 Urgent needs for public sectors to apply PPPs 
 Rapidly developing and growing PPPs market 
 A favorable business environment and a wide 
Government supports 
THREATS 
 Political instability 
 Fiscal shortfalls  
 Unclear legal framework for PPPs 
 Corruption 
 Inflation risks  
 Currency risks  
 Lack of PPPs professionals  
 Lack of accountability measures for public 
and private sectors  
 
Literature review of Mongolian PPPs system 
There are two vital studies that specifically focus on the PPP policy of Mongolia. The first 
one entitled, the “Public-Private Infrastructure Investment and Deposit Insurance in Mongolia” 
was conducted within the framework of Knowledge Sharing Program in 2011. This study was 
conducted right after the Adoption of the Concession Law of Mongolia in 2010, and a 
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comparative study with the Korean PPP system was made concerning the PFS system, legal 
framework, procedural guidelines and introduction of the limited deposit protection scheme in 
Mongolia (KDI, 2011).  
The other study titled, the “Green Public-Private partnership for Public infrastructure in 
Mongolia: PPP Model and Technical Guidelines for Green Education Buildings” (hereinafter 
referred to as Green PPP study) was conducted in 2016, by the Global Green Growth Institute. 
This study mainly concerns the Mongolian PPP system in a general way and the study 
specifically focuses on PPPs for construction of eco-friendly educational buildings in Mongolia.  
The main findings concerning the key risks and challenges of the Green PPP study were divided 
into three categories: legal/institution, operational, and financial. 
Table 5 Key risks and challenges of Mongolian PPP system 
Area  Key Risks and Challenges 
Legal/ 
Institutional 
Weak legal framework for PPPs (the Concession Law, other associated laws); 
Lack of coordination among government stakeholders (between the central PPP authority and 
line 
ministries and between the central and local governments, etc.); 
Lack of contract enforcement power; 
Change in government policies on concessions and the focal agency affecting investor 
confidence; 
Lack of planning/screening and rigorous project assessment in project preparation; 
Underdeveloped procurement system; 
Lack of government emphasis on environmental sustainability in concession projects; 
Operational Lack of technical guidelines for project preparation and procurement; 
Lack of competition in bidding; 
No mechanism for performance evaluation for performance-based model PPP projects; 
Technical risk of inappropriate technical schemes or poor technical design for green education 
projects; 
Lack of incentives for green technologies; 
Weak government capacity to manage complex PPP deals; 
Lack of qualified private companies to undertake large-scale infrastructure projects; 
Financial Lack of long term finance in the local financial market;; 
Financial risk relating to interest rate and foreign exchange rate fluctuation; 
Limited state budget to meet long term payment obligations and/or to fill viability gap; 
Lack of incentives for green technologies; 
Source: Global Green Growth Institute, p. 5, 2016.   
Consequently, the policy recommendations given by the two studies are:  
Legal/institutional Aspect: linking between the Law on Concession (PPP law) and other relevant 
laws; providing a clear definition of PPP; regulating performance-based payment or service 
contract PPP model as a PPP type; clarifying roles and responsibilities of concerned parties; PPP 
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project planning has to be in accordance with mid-to long-term infrastructure plans of the 
government and national investment priorities; involvement of the Ministry of Finance in the 
early stage of project development and approval, especially for service contract type PPP 
projects; setting up a consistent and transparent procurement process by law, supporting 
regulations and guidelines.  
The Operational Aspect: creation of adequate databases; developing assessment guidelines and 
methodologies; avoiding direct contracting to increase market competition and ensure VFM; 
promoting participation of foreign companies and investors; establishing a performance 
evaluation (PE) system for performance-based model PPP projects.  
Financial Aspect: introduction of ex ante evaluation system such as PFS, simplified PFS, Ex 
Officio Selection, as well as intermediate evaluation frameworks such as TPCM, RDF and RSF; 
and developing investments and risk sharing measures.  
This study makes references for supporting arguments from these two studies where 
relevant. In general, the main distinguishing character of this paper would be to find out the 
causes of failure factors from the empirical data and cases analysis; analyzing the experiences 
and current problems of PPPs from a normative perspective; and proposing policy 
recommendations based on empirical and normative analyses that is suitable for the level of 
socio-economic development of Mongolia.   
 
A Brief Introduction to Mongolian Context and Rationales for 
improvement of the PPP system 
Mongolia is a land-locked country in the North-East Asia and borders with the People’s 
Republic of China and the Russian Federation. Traditionally, Mongolia has been a nomadic 
country with a history of over 2000 years and, from 1930-1990eMongolia had been a socialist 
country. Most of the foundations of its cities and other infrastructure were initiated and built 
during 1960-1985 with the technical and financial support of the Soviet Union. However, 
starting from the 1990s, the country has made its transition to a market economy and with a 
new economic environment, the processes of economic liberalization, urbanization, 
industrialization, market privatization and open trade have started in Mongolia. Since the start 
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of the transition, the government has been the main player in the provision of infrastructure, 
with the private sector playing a limited role in sharing the burden in infrastructure 
development. In other words, since the transition, the collaboration between the private and 
public sectors has been underexplored. Therefore until very recently, no specific policies and 
regulations have been promoted by the Government of Mongolia (GOM) in the sphere of 
private sector support, development and collaboration, due to the promotion of a 
noninterventionist liberal market policy. Specifically, collaboration and partnership between 
the GOM and the private sector have remained unexplored in the area of infrastructure 
construction and provision. This fact might also be connected with the absence of competitive 
private companies, and a lack of human and knowledge capitals in the economy after the 
transition to the market economy. However, after a more than a decade of promoting a market 
economy, it has become clear that the state is incapable of successfully taking care of 
infrastructure development and provision. At the same time, the spread of globalization and 
NPM around the world as well as the appearance of national companies have come together to 
change policy perspective from being about state-led infrastructure provision to one that is 
partnership-oriented. As Mitchell-Weaver and Manning found out in the 1980s, the NPM 
paradigm driven by ‘market discipline’ had facilitated the quick promotion of PPPs amongst the 
Third World countries. (Graeme A Hodge et all., 2010). Overall, it could be understood that, in 
Mongolia, both the GOM and the private sector still have had very limited experiences in 
collectively and effectively working together, particularly in the area of infrastructure 
development and provision, which is one of the basic things to consider for the successful 
implementation of PPP policies in Mongolia. 
In 2008, the Parliament adopted the National Development Strategy based on the 
Millennium Development Goals, where the importance of development and provision of 
various infrastructure in order to increase economic competitiveness and eliminate poverty, 
was strongly highlighted (National Development Strategy of Mongolia; Global Green Growth 
Institute, 2016). With the adoption of the National Development Strategy, public policy has 
been shifted towards the new direction of the promotion of a strong private sector, a high 
collaboration between public and private sectors, decentralization of government roles by 
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promoting the innovation and competition in public affairs, and so on. In particular, the 
National Strategy reflects ambitious aims for the infrastructure development such as: 1) to 
become a key electricity exporting country; 2) to develop and renew the intra- and intercity 
paved roads of the whole country; 3) to develop the transportation system (paved road and 
railway) in order to become a country that effectively ‘bridges’ Asia and Europe; 4) to develop 
railways so that mining products could be exported with fewer costs; and 5) while doing so, 
highly emphasizing in all spheres, the promotion of collaboration and partnership with the 
private sector.    
Based on the National Development Strategy, the Private Sector Development Strategy 
was adopted in 2008. Based on the Private Sector Development Strategy, the State Policy on 
PPP and the Concession Law of Mongolia2 was adopted in 2009 and 2010 respectively. All of 
these policy documents explicitly express the strong will of the State to promote the private 
sector and to reduce the burden of the GOM for developing infrastructure, providing social 
services and reducing infrastructure gaps. The reason for mentioning all of these initiatives is 
that one would be able to get the impression that the country would really be able to solve its 
various infrastructure problems efficiently if the private sector would be significantly involved 
through mutual collaboration and promotion. In other words, the state-led policy of 
infrastructure development has now, significantly shifted to favoring a high level of private 
sector participation.  
Key infrastructure gaps in Mongolia 
The National Development Strategy has assigned ambitious goals for its infrastructure 
developments to address huge gaps in various infrastructures in the country due to its 
increasing population, urbanization and industrial needs (mainly the export of mining products).  
Road transport 
Mongolia’s paved road network is extensively underdeveloped. In 2015, paved roads 
that connect the main provinces, the capital and other small cities in the whole country have 
reached 44.7% of total road coverage (Interview with D.Ganbat, Minister of Roads, 
                                                 
2 Mongolia has taken technical assistance to set up PPP frameworks and to develop an institutional capacity for 
PPPs from IBRD/IDA (Graeme p.472). 
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Transportation, Construction and Urban Development, 2016). Mongolia’s National 
Development Strategy considers road infrastructure to be a key instrument in fostering regional 
development. It targets an ambitious goal to pave the entire national road network (11,250 km) 
by 2021 (Government of Mongolia Action Plan 2016-2020, 2016). Certainly, in order to achieve 
this ambitious plan, huge road projects would be required and that would certainly demand 
more advanced technologies, human skills, and management processes, which in many cases 
the private sector possesses. It should also be highlighted that the detailed implementing policy 
documents expressly reflect that certain paved road projects should be accomplished through 
PPPs (The Detailed Implementing Plan of the Action Plan 2016-2020, 2016).  
Overall, together with Ulaanbaatar’s urban development plans, this would require building 
about 1,000 km of new paved roads each year (ADB, 2016).  Moreover, the periodic 
maintenance of paved roads which had been ignored during the past years, would further raise 
the development and improvement of the paved roads of the country significantly (ADB, 2016). 
In 2016, MNT 55 billion was proposed to be allocated by the relevant Ministry for the repair 
and maintenance of roads, but only MNT 8 billion was approved by the Parliament (Interview 
with D.Zagdradnaa, 2016). This shows the insufficient budget of Mongolia to take care of the 
public infrastructure. 
Rail transport 
Mongolia has a large mineral resource export-oriented economy. In the past, railroads 
that crossed over big mining deposits to the Soviet Union were built with the assistance of the 
Soviet Union in order to export mineral, agricultural, and other products to the Soviet Union. 
Currently, new huge mining deposits are being explored and there is great demand to build 
railways from these deposits to the border of the Republic of China for transportation. However, 
currently, both paved and to a larger extent, unpaved roads are used for exporting these 
minerals, which is causing many environmental and social issues such as high costs of 
exportation, resulting dust, pollution, including conflicts with the local people and so on. Even 
nomadic people who have been living in the area for a long time, have had to leave the area 
due to the side effects and the impossibility of continuing a traditional way of living (Mining and 
Human Rights, National Human Rights Commission of Mongolia, 2012). Therefore, there is a 
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great demand to build new railways. For instance, some of these new railway projects are 
“Tavan tolgoi” a huge mining site is located 240 km from the north of the Chinese border and 
“Oyu tolgoi” is located 150 km from the “Tavan Tolgoi” railway project. This shows the extent of 
land area that would be affected. 
Social infrastructure  
The demand for social infrastructure is also an example of demand for educational 
facilities in Mongolia. The current capacity of educational facilities is overused due to a deficit 
of educational facilities in a country that has been driven by a rapid urbanization, population 
growth but a lack of a proper supply of new educational facilities during recent years. Therefore, 
decreasing the study shift of secondary schools from three to two was emphasized in the 
Government Action plan (Government of Mongolia Action Plan 2016-2020, 2016). Currently, 
secondary schools take 3-4 study shifts and classes enroll many more children than are the 
established standards and norms.   
As of October 2015, children of kindergarten age and school age amount to 776,614; whereas 
the current capacity of educational facilities is able to host 472,082 children (Construction 
Development Center of Mongolia, Construction Need and Demand for Secondary School and 
Kindergarten in Mongolia, 2015). From this, although there are 505,343 school age children, the 
current capacity is only able to host 358,930 school age children. In other words, there is a need 
to build additional secondary schools for the surplus 146,413 children. For the kindergarten 
level, the current capacity is 113,15 whereas the total number of kindergarten age children is 
271,251.  In total MNT 1,758,282.8 million worth of investment is required in filling in the gap in 
education facilities (Global Green Growth Institute, 2016).  
Electricity 
In Mongolia, the need and demand for electricity rises about 7-8% each year. Mongolia 
imports the electricity from the Russian Federation, in total up to UD$ 40 million each year 
(Mongolian National Broadcasting, 2017). The Government Action Plan aims to fully supply its 
own electricity needs domestically, and then exporting to foreign countries, particularly to the 
Republic of China due the fact that the country has great potential in producing renewable 
electricity, particularly in wind, water and solar (Government of Mongolia Action Plan 2016-
2020, 2016). 
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The financial gap in Mongolia for infrastructure development 
In the past several years, Mongolia’s GDP growth has been decreasing due to 
fluctuations of mineral prices in the international market and due to an implementation of 
improper public policies which consist of extensive expenditure. 
Table 6 Macroeconomic data of Mongolia 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
GDP Growth Rate (%) 17.3 12.3 11.6 7.9 2.3 
GDP per capita (USD) 3736.1 4329.0 4365.4 4168.9 3951.9 
Total invest (%, GDP) 58.2 55.9 53.3 35.2 26.2 
Average Inflation (%, CPI) 7.7 15.0 8.6 13.0 5.9 
Current Account  (%, GDP) -26.5 -27.4 -25.4 -11.5 -4.8 
Capital Account  (%, GD P) -3.7 -8.3 -7.5 -8.8 -5.1 
Gross External Debt (USD 
million) 
9,627.5 15,386.5 19,022.1 20,942.3 21,829.5 
Sovereign credit rating 
(Moody’s) 
B1 B1 -> B2 B2 B2 -> Caa1 Caa1 
Public debt, total (%, GDP) 32.7 51.3 67.3 76.5 N/A 
External debt ratio 23.5 39.0 46.3 54.9 N/A 
Domestic debt ratio 9.1 12.3 21.1 21.6 N/A 
Ratio of actual spending 
over initial budget of the 
capital account in the 
budget law (%) 
28.8 -18.1 -19.2 N/A N/A 
Sources: IMF, World Bank, World Economic Outlook Database, EIU, Country Report Mongolia, Bank of Mongolia. 
Cross referenced from KDI School, 2017. 
It should also be emphasized that the Mongolian capital market is underdeveloped and does not 
play a big role in long-term investments and financing. While the banking sector dominates on one hand, 
on the other hand, the capital, stock and bond markets remain greatly underdeveloped. For instance, 
GOM bonds account for 98% of the total bond market, which directly indicates the imbalanced 
development of the bond market of Mongolia.  
Figure 1  Structure of the Mongolia Financial Sector     
Figure 2 Government Bonds 
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Source: World Bank, World Economic Outlook Database, 2017 
Currently, the Mongolian economy is considered to be in recession with a GDP growth 
rate of 2.3% in 2015. In 2017, the IMF approved UD$ 5.5 billion financial package for Mongolia 
to support the country in resolving its financial crises by 2021. In 2016, the government debt of 
Mongolia had risen rapidly to 90% of the GDP in 2016 (IMF, year). Overall, it could be analyzed 
that the financial capability of the government to effectively decrease its infrastructure gaps in 
the coming years looks to be quite gloomy.   
 
 
Figure 3 Sovereign Credit Rating History of Mongolia 
  
Source: Moody’s Investor Service, 2017 
PPPs experiences in Mongolia: Identification of failure factors 
This part makes analyses of relevant government reports, documents, PPPs statistics, 
contracts and yellow news, in order to find out factors contributing to the failures of PPP 
practices in Mongolia.  
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Legal and policy framework  
Lack of clearly-defined priority PPPs and too many types of PPPs 
Resolution No. 317 of the GOM that approved the Concession List was adopted in 2010, 
and then amended in 2013 and 2015. The approved List of Concessions includes 234 projects 
consisting of 29 road and transportation, 121 education, 32 infrastructure, 21 energy, 6 
environment, 14 health, 2 rail, 3 communications , 2 pipelines, and 4 airport projects. The GOM 
Resolution consists of two PPP procurement types; namely competitive tendering and direct 
agreement types. According to the Government Resolution, overall, 117 direct agreement 
(without competitive tendering) projects should be implemented. So far, 99 of these have been 
concluded without going through a competitive procurement process (Monitoring and 
Evaluation Report of Projects of Concessionaires, Tendering and Contract Implementation, 
Monitoring, Evaluation and Internal Audit Unit of National Development Agency of Mongolia, 
November, 2016 (hereinafter referred to as MER, 2016). 
Figure 4 Concessions in the Concession List of Mongolia by types and by sectors 
  
Various PPP types are also used for various projects in the Concession List such as build 
transfer types of BT, DBT, DRT, DDBT projects which are over 151; build operate transfer type of 
BOT, BOO, DBOO, DBOT, DFBOO, DFBOT, FOT, DevOT and other projects which are over 48, and 
the rest which are lease and other types of projects such as DBLT, RLOT, POO and so on. It could 
be seen that there are too many types of PPPs  which might create a confusion, especially when 
there is a lack of proper guidelines and  limited specialized human capacity to handle them. 
Moreover, DFBOT, DBOT or BOT has been used by indicating the same obligations of 
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concessionaires notwithstanding their differing types of PPPs. The obligations to design, finance, 
operate and transfer were exactly same in DFBOT concession contract for the power station 
electricity transmission line at ‘Uvs province’ and the BOT concession contract for Telmen 
thermal power station (Power station electricity transmission line at Uvs province DFBOT, 2016; 
Telmen thermal power station BOT concession contract, 2013). In other words, concessionaires 
had the same responsibility to design and finance their own cost for building concession items 
in both BOT and DFBOT contracts. Importantly, it could be seen that there were no policies 
concerning priority PPP types depending on infrastructure types and public interest, based on 
the current application of PPP types and from the Concession Law which generally lists PPP 
types with simple definitions.  
Lack of clarity of the best applicable PPP types and PPPs  
The PPP Unit, line ministries and other relevant local governments had to conduct 
studies on necessary projects that could be implemented through PPPs arrangements and 
propose policy on the proper types of PPPs for the implementation. However, in practice, for 
any policy priorities and related projects on which government functions could be delegated 
and implemented by PPPs, the desirable and proper types of concessions have not yet been 
determined by the PPP Unit, line ministries, central and local governments. All in all, it is 
evidenced that the current integrated policy concerning PPPs, priority areas for PPPs 
implementation, and analysis how to better make use of the budget and relevant necessary 
research to do so, have been ignored since the implementation of PPP policy in Mongolia (ICL, 
2015). 
Procurement framework 
A direct contracting and a lack of competition enhancing procurement process 
 
Half of the concession projects included in the Resolution (117 out of 234) have been 
implemented without any competitive procurements process. According to the Concession Law 
of Mongolia, there are only a limited number of circumstances where a project could be 
implemented through the use of the direct contracting method such as: when it concerns 
national security; when one or several entities have a common interest with their own 
intellectual and related property; when no proposal was submitted in response to the tender 
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announcement; or when no proposals have met the requirements of the tender; in those cases 
the authorized entity would issue an opinion to conclude a direct agreement and submit it to 
the government or the respective Citizens’ Representatives Assembly (Concession Law of 
Mongolia, Article 17, 2010) for approval. However, many of the direct contracting type of 
projects are roads, educational facilities and other constructions that do not seem to be part of 
the exceptional cases as listed in the Concession Law. Consequently, this massive application of 
direct contracting are mainly connected to the exception of no proposals at all or no proposals 
that meet the requirements of tenders. There might be various reasons for this, such as an 
immature socio-economic development, less developed private sector competitiveness and so 
on, but for purposes of this paper, policy issues related to the application of direct contracting 
would be focused upon. 
Figure 5 Concessions in the Concession List of Mongolia by procurement types 
 In terms of the timeframe, the bulk 
of RFPs were announced in the same time 
period given to accept bids for RFPs, which is 
approximately 2 months. For instance, 2 
projects for construction of substations, and 
high voltage power transmission air lines 
between Baganuur-Choir (178 km) and Baganuur-Ulaanbaatar (130 km); 25 projects for 
construction of schools, kindergartens, sport complexes all around the country; again 9 huge 
education projects to build dormitories, kindergartens, schools, cultural centers; 8 projects to 
build agricultural production and technology parks were announced simultaneously in one 
announcement, all in 2016 (Invitation to participate in the tender process for the concessions of 
electricity projects, January, 2016; Invitation to participate in the tender process for the 
concessions for educational facilities, March, 2016;  Invitation to participate in the tender 
process for the concessions for educational facilities, April, 2016;  Invitation to participate in the 
tender process for the concessions for agricultural and technology parks, April, 2016). It is 
impossible to have a true and genuine competition in such a tight timeframe, given the level of 
private sector development in electricity, construction and other fields. Moreover, in most 
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cases powerful companies have to some extent, oligopolistic characteristics whose participation 
in one project restricts further participation in other projects, according to the requirements 
stipulated by the Concession Law of Mongolia. In other words, the tendering practice could not 
promote competition for projects properly.  
Furthermore, it has been established that, in general, there has been a very low level of 
participation of private parties in competitive bidding due to the unclear PPP procurement 
process that does not help the private sector to understand the benefits, the support from the 
government of Mongolia, guarantees, risks, costs, payments of each projects (The Assessment 
of the Implementation of Concession Law, Mongolian National Audit Office, 2015 (hereinafter 
referred to as ICL, 2015). This is obviously linked to an absence of proper ex ante CBAs of 
concession projects by the public sector. Consequently, this lack of ex ante analysis further 
leads to overly-generalized RFPs that do not give clear information to private parties for their 
informed decision making and active participation in bidding processes. For instance, no private 
partner had expressed their interest in bidding for 5 projects and only one unqualified bidder 
expressed their interest for 1 project out of 16 projects that were announced RFPs in 2014 (ICL, 
2015).  
Lack of proper ex ante analysis 
It is the practice of procurement in Mongolia that a private party submits its general 
capability information along with technical and financial proposals. Based on that, the public 
sector would simply choose the best proposal and conclude a concession contract with the 
winner, without necessarily knowing what is the best proposal due to the lack of their own 
CBAs. 
Only after the conclusion of a concession contract, would the relevant council of line 
ministries approve the design and the detailed technical and economic analysis of a 
concessionaire.  
Figure 6 PPPs procurement process of Mongolia  
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Consequently, it is clear that the public sector is poorly-equipped in choosing the best 
proposals due to the lack of their own analysis which could create information asymmetry and 
cause them a disadvantage in negotiations. It also could lead to biased decision-making that is 
based on a sole private party’s proposal. Also, agreeing on the amount of investment or the 
concession cost in the concession contract beforehand with private parties, restricts the public 
sector party in having flexibility to make various changes and amendments to the design and 
technical and economic analysis. This is not effective and such an illogical procurement process 
might mean that the public sector does not really much care about the cost efficiencies and to 
increase added value except to merely proceed with projects. Indeed, the study of the Global 
Green Growth Institute says, (Global Green Growth Institute, 2015) 
“While MDBs and donor agencies have provided technical support and capacity 
development for evaluating the suitability of proposed PPP projects, pre-feasibility studies have 
not been commonly used in these assessments. Instead, selection by way of political haggling 
followed by post-selection justifications for the chosen projects have been more the norm. 
Moreover, though cost benefit analyses are legally required, their implementation has been 
limited due to lack of capacity and resources.”  
Finally, it is questionable whether it is desirable to predetermine the procurement types 
in an inflexible manner, according to the approved Concession List of 2013 and 2015 from the 
beginning. As of October 2017, there are many projects that have not even announced 
tendering but are listed as direct contracting procurement projects. This logic and perspective 
are not compatible with the fast-changing capability of business environment and mobility of 
An announcement of a Request to bid by the PPP Unit 
Submission of instersts of participation by private parties 
Selection based on general capability, financial and technical  
proposals of private parties by the PPP Unit   
Negotiation and conclusion of a contract arranged by the PPP 
Unit  
Submission of a design, technical and economic analysis by a 
concessionaire for approval, amendemnet to line ministries  
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the private sector. So, it is very difficult to analyze the logic and intention of the inclusion of the 
procurement type in the Concession list. An inflexible predetermined way – with exception for 
national security purposes - would only impede competition and create rent seeking and 
private sector excess profit-seeking behaviors that are detrimental to the public interest.  
Lack of contract validation and execution  
As of 2016, a competitive tendering has been announced for 58 projects out of 102 
competitive tendering projects, and in total 121 contracts have been concluded out of 234 
projects (MER, 2016). Out of 121 contracts, only 26 contracts are currently in force, 15 
contracts were not validated and 80 were cancelled (MER, 2016). That means 95 projects out of 
121 projects did not go into force although 80 projects were concluded and finalized and 15 to 
some extend went through the procurement process. In other words, approximately 21-22% of 
the projects have been successfully concluded in practice, which is too low in comparison to the 
efforts made by the contracting parties. There could be many reasons behind that such as lack 
of proper study, research and evaluation of potential concessionaries, lack of accountability and 
transparency, lack of trust, conflicts of interest, lack of institutional and human capacity and so 
on. Probably, all of them to some extent, have contributed to the failures.  
For instance, as mentioned before, many projects were announced at the same time, 
thus this fact has greatly influenced the workload of the PPP Unit, which has only 4 specialists in 
total. Therefore, due to the increased workload, concession documents were not registered 
properly, reports were not properly written by working groups and overall, the quality of the 
tendering process such as management of tendering, evaluation, contract drawing, negotiating 
and so on, were negatively affected by this tendering management (ICL, 2015). The risk 
assessment of the performance of PPP Unit was calculated as highly risky at 80.7%, according to 
the risk assessment based on 13 indicators (ICL, 2015). Consequently, it is clear that the 
workload of the PPP Unit is not proportional to its workforce. 
Institutional framework  
Lack of integrated registration database of PPPs due to constant institutional changes 
and lack of human resources  
No integrated registration systems nor electronic databases about concessions have 
been created at the local or even central levels, which again, does not comply with the 
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Concession Law. Due to the lack of database information, some of the local and national 
projects have ended up coinciding (ICL, 2015). The PPP Unit was not able to archive all 
documents and materials related to the tenders and keep them in a database as required by 
the Law. The Monitoring report explains that this problem of poor documentation and 
achieving was directly linked to the mobility of the human resources of the PPP Unit caused by 
constant institutional changes (MER, 2016). The important thing here to highlight is, this small 
problem has a potential to create bigger problems such as fiscal instability, loss of 
accountability, transparency and the like. 
Lack of proper planning of Concessions based on analyses and evaluations  
 So far, the Parliament has cancelled 15 projects that were approved, by themselves 
(MER, 2016).  Although, 15 projects might not be impressive out of 234 projects, but still, it 
indicates that there are drawbacks related to the approval of the Concession List. According to 
the Assessment of the Implementation of Concession Law, the following drawbacks in terms of 
the approval of the concession list have been identified. The articles 6.2.5, 7.1.2 of the 
Concession Law require that the PPP Unit and the other relevant authorities have to make 
studies on concessions and formulate the list of concessions based on the studies conducted. 
However, in practice, the List of Concessions was developed without any proper studies and 
analysis. For instance, the list of concessions proposed by the line ministries were not 
accompanied with the relevant cost-benefit analyses as required by the Law and yet, formally 
approved by the Government (ICL, 2015). The line ministries and local authorities have not 
properly followed the obligation to conduct CBAs when developing lists of concessions for the 
approval of the Government. For instance, from 2010-2013 in the capital city, 75 out of a total 
of 83 projects were not accompanied with proper CBAs. Moreover, during that time the 
relevant authorities have not taken comments and suggestions from other government 
organizations for the preparation of their lists of concessions. That was again, in breach of the 
obligations stated in the Concession Law. In other words, this indicates that collaboration 
within the public sector is still not common practice in Mongolia.  
Lack of methodological, expert assistances and human capacity building for PPPs 
Furthermore, the PPP unit has not properly provided methodological and expert 
assistance to other relevant authorities on matters related to granting and implementing 
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concessions as required by the Concession Law (ICL, 2015). Moreover, the relevant specialists at 
local government levels have made poor efforts to increase their knowledge related to PPPs as 
required by the Concession Law. Thus, the relevant government staffs and authorities have not 
gained and developed the necessary knowledge and skills for the implementation of the 
Concession Law. As a result of this lack of capacity building process, within the public sector, 
namely the ministries, central and local governments, did not fulfill their obligations as stated in 
the Concession Law, such as providing definition of policy priorities and related projects on 
which government functions could be delegated and implemented by the PPPs, as well as the 
type of desirable and proper types of concessions, conducting of CBAs and so on, in practice.  
  The main reason was that the human resources capacity of the PPP Unit itself is not 
specialized and sufficiently prepared, meaning that it has limited capacity to educate others (ICL, 
2015).  
Lack of monitoring of quality of PPPs  
There are 4 road projects that have already been completed. However, the State 
Commission has not accepted and approved 2 projects (ICL, 2015). Also, although one 
educational project has been completed, the State Commission has not approved it.  The 
reason behind that might be connected with quality issues since there could be no other 
plausible reason to withhold the provision of highly demanded public services.  
The public opinion concerning some road projects has been negative in terms of its 
quality. Mr. S.Bekhbat, an expert for PPPs, has claimed that problems in road projects are 
caused by the use of the BT type which does not ensure long-lasting quality. He claims further 
that the use of BT might not only burden the budget in the future, but also create a room for 
the construction of low quality roads (Dialogue with S.Bekhbat, Itoim, 2016). The Monitoring 
report emphasized that “…concessionaires reported their contract execution process as 10-95% 
without any evidences, and other proven documents. Thus, it is important to conduct quality 
inspection during the project progress and check the quality compliance of projects.” (MER, 
2016). Importantly, the Concession Law requires the PPP Unit to adopt specific regulations or 
rules on monitoring and evaluation of PPPs. Along with this, the Law requires a discussion of 
the implementation of the Concession Law at the Parliament based on M&E reports of the PPP 
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Unit annually. In the years 2014 and 2015, provisions related to M&E were added to the 
Concession Law, in order to address the abovementioned drawbacks. However, no detailed 
regulations on monitoring and evaluation of PPPs have been adopted so far. Consequently, it 
could be seen that a sophisticated quality monitoring method has not yet been established 
between private and public sectors and that the monitoring of quality and progress of projects 
still depends on unreliable subjective responses of concessionaires. This shows that there is no 
accountability mechanism, based on clearly defined performance indicators, in place since 2010. 
The current practice of PPPs based on 39 signed concession contracts  
The website of the National Development Agency of Mongolia, where the PPP Unit is 
located, contains overall 393 signed concession agreements as of 2017. Out of 39 concession 
contracts, 1 was signed in 2011, 1 in 2013, 4 in 2014, 11 in 2015 and 22 in 2016. It should be  
mentioned that some of the contracts are not yet executed, some of them were cancelled, and 
some of them were completed. A further analysis of these 39 contracts would enable the 
understanding of the current PPP practices from an evidence-based way. The main points of 
these concession agreements are summarized below as follows.  
Figure 7 Signed concession contracts as of 2017 of Mongolia 
 
Mongolia started the use of PPPs with paved roads, and continued with various social 
infrastructure concessions in education, electricity, health and culture during the last two years. 
It was an interesting that the GOM did not invest any real money in any of the 39 projects. 
                                                 
3 Please refer to Annex I for detailed information. 
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Other nonmonetary grants were given in addition to the typical4 government support for the 6 
specific projects as described below. Typical guarantees and supports were provided for the 
rest of the 33 projects (Annex I for detailed information). 
Table 7 Projects that were given nonmonetary grants of Mongolia  
№ Concessions Guarantees 
1 Mining, Metallurgy Complex Mining licenses 
2 -Human development complex center 
(BOT) 
-Telmen thermal power station (BOT) 
 
Not to give permission to build similar function 
complexes and to provide similar services within 
the area to any state related 
organizations/companies 
3 Railway base structure between 
Erdenet and Ovoot mine 
Pre-emptive right to implement the Expansion 
of the Base Structure and other various 
privileges 
4 Fifth combined heat and power plant  Guaranteed revenues, compensation amounts, 
other commitments 
5 Building of an incomplete hospital /260 
beds/ 
Incomplete building 
6 Mongolian Nationality Museum Transfer of all exhibitions  
 
Consequently, it could be observed that the current trend of government burden-
sharing for PPPs is the granting of nonmonetary privileges or grants that do not require outright 
payments from the GOM. Although, while a slight look at this policy could tell us that 
government guarantee policy is economically-beneficial for a developing country, on the other 
side, it is that there might a wide variety of hidden risks for the GOM and the public to bear. 
This is because the current GOM policy imposes financial, construction, maintenance, operation 
all risks i.e. too much risks to concessionaires. Moreover, a wide variety of social infrastructure 
                                                 
4 An import of equipment and materials support; a support for giving a work permission for foreign workforce; a 
support for giving various rights, permissions such as land use right, permissions/licenses to use water, electricity, 
heating, communication and all the necessary collaborations from government regulating authorities shall be 
provided in timely and promptly ways without any delays. In electricity, heating and vital public service PPPs, a 
product purchase agreement is concluded with the GOM in addition to the typical supports. 
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could not take place unless a project is considered very profitable for a concessionaire to bear 
these high risks.  
Table 8 Signed concession contracts by types and sectors as of 2017 of Mongolia 
     Sectors 
 
Signed 
agreements 
Built-Transfer 
(BT) 
Build-Operate-Transfer/others  
Infrastructure and 
 
3 0 3 /BOT/ 
Road and Transportation 10 7 /BT/ 2/DBT/ 1 /BOT/ 
Energy 5 1 4 /BOO, BOT, DFBOM, DFBOM/ 
Health 1 0 1 /ROT/ 
Education 18 18 0 
Sports and Culture 1 0 1 /DBOO/ 
Railway 1 0 1 /DBOT/ 
Total 39 28 11 
 
Figure 8 Signed contracts by sectors and types as of 2017 of Mongolia 
       
In terms of types of concessions, 10 kinds of PPP types were used for 39 contracts.  
Figure 9 PPPs types of 39 concession contracts 
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In April 2017, the Parliament prohibited the conclusion of BT-type agreements until the 
2018 Budget Law is approved (Resolution 29, Parliament of Mongolia, 2017). Moreover, 
according to the Budget Amendment Law of Mongolia of 2017, its Annex II lists 12 BT type of 
projects that has to be repaid during 2015-2019 with the total investment of MNT 352,113.9 
million, of that MNT 70,933.7 million which was repaid in 2017 (The Budget Amendment Law, 
Annex II, 2017). Certain protocols related to the adoption of the Amendment Law of Budget 
and Concession Laws mentioned that 1 km of paved road approximately cost MNT 600-800 
million with the government procurement, whereas some concession contracts have been 
concluded as stating that 1 km cost MNT 3 billion (Protocol on the Amendment Law of the 
Concession Law, Protocol of the Economic Standing Committee of 2017 Spring Parliamentary 
Session, 2017). This neglects to take into account integrated cost or investment estimations. 
Thus, huge opportunistic behaviors might have taken place. In connection to that, the GOM has 
recently announced their decision to conduct an audit of PPPs amounting to MNT 11.1 trillion 
as required by the IMF (D.Khayankyarvaa, An audit would also have to be made for concession 
contracts, ikon.mn, 2017).   
Figure 10 Procurement and PPP types of 39 concession contracts 
 
Only 8 out of 39 projects have used the competitive tendering procurement. The procurement 
type of one PPP was unknown. 
Summary of the PPPs failure factors in Mongolia 
In summary, the whole section could be categorized by listing the failure factors of the 
PPP practices of Mongolia into conceptual/policy, procurement, institutional and fiscal 
frameworks: 
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 Confusion about the PPP concept; confusion about the preferable types of PPPs due to 
application of too many PPP types, improper types of PPPs 
 Confusion about the private sector is the best (No use of VfM) positioned to handle all 
infrastructure projects, thus lacking a policy concerning which government functions; 
infrastructures could be delegated and implemented by the PPPs 
 Confusion about bundling and risk distribution; No government financial risk sharing policy 
for a balanced social and economic efficiency i.e. confusion about how to sustainably share 
risks and make PPPs efficient in the long-run 
 No short and long-term PPPs integrated policies; planning that defines priority PPPs, 
preferable projects that should be implemented through PPPs, describing the proper PPPs 
types for different projects; that is compatible with the fiscal policy and development 
priorities; and that is adaptable to the changing socio-economic conditions. This unclear 
policy direction and maneuvering flexibility led to various problems such as theapplication 
of too many types of PPPs, disproportional implementation of PPPs to the budget 
sustainability, a political opportunism and similar. 
 
Institutional 
 The lack of creation of an integrated PPP database, and a high level of contracts invalidation 
and cancellation (79%) have occurred due to the constant institutional changes of the PPP 
Unit and the overloaded specialists working in the Unit. 
 Poor collaboration within the public sector on the exchange of expertise and mutual 
consultations have taken place. Overall, various factors such as hierarchical structure, 
underdeveloped collaboration mechanism, overworked public servants and in general the 
current culture of collaboration of government organizations have had a great hindrance to 
the creation of inter-organizational, inter-personal collaboration in Mongolia. 
 Too centralized with regards to both policy related and operational PPPs management in 
the PPPs Unit  
Procurement 
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 A list of Concessions has been approved by the Parliament for concessions that have not 
been accompanied with proper CBAs. Consequently, although there are some formalities i.e. 
an approval by public authorities, in general a private party’s technical and economic 
analysis, which is not a social evaluation-based, functions as a back-up rather than being 
used for up-front public-sector CBAs based PPPs evaluation. 
 A lack of a competition enhancing procurement process that applies too much direct 
contracting. Namely, 59% of contracts in the Concession List, 79% of the signed contracts as 
of 2017 were the direct contracting type.  
 The one time “shot” announcement policy of a RFP might have influenced the level of 
competition negatively, given the level of development of the private sector and its 
absorbing capacity. No clear information concerning risks, benefits, costs, guarantees and 
payments has been provided in detail in RFPs, which to a significant extent, has discouraged 
participation of private parties in competitive biddings. Consequently, almost competition 
discouraging procurement processes have become a practice in Mongolia. 
 A lack of reliable, sophisticated monitoring of quality during construction and operation 
phases; no performance indicator based monitoring, evaluation and compliance mechanism  
Financial and fiscal 
 Around 69% of concessions in the Concession List of 2013 and around 72% of signed 
contracts as of 2017, that are available on the website of National Development Agency 
are BT-type of contracts. Namely, as of 2016, 28 out of 39 signed concession contracts were 
BT type which only guaranteed 3 years of quality after the completion of construction. More 
importantly, all BT types of contracts have to be paid back to private parties after the 
completion of constructions. That is 2-4 years at the latest, which might burden the budget 
and restrict policy flexibility of the GOM. Further, the majority of BT contracts were paved 
road and education contracts. Importantly, it is highly risky when the public and private 
opportunistic behaviors might influence negatively on the quality of roads and educational 
buildings, as it concerns the safety and health of the whole public. 
 Although, there many types of government support listed in the Concession Law, in practice 
no cases of giving real monetary support for PPPs has been recorded  
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A comparative analysis of PPPs practice and policy of the 
Republic of Korea and Mongolia 
In this part, a narrower comparative case, policy, legal, procurement, institutional and 
fiscal frameworks analyses of the South Korea and Mongolia are made, within the frameworks 
of identified failure factors in practice, in order to have a better understanding the causes of 
failures and gaps in the PPP policy in Mongolia.  
Case analysis  
In this part, more specific PPP issues are analyzed based on a comparative case basis. 
The case study consists of two parts, namely 
 BTL of the Republic of Korea and BT, DBT, etc. of Mongolia /for non-profit 
generating public goods/ 
 BTO of the Republic of Korea and BOT, BOO, DBOO etc. of Mongolia /for profit 
generating infrastructures/ 
Comparison of BTL of the Republic of Korea v. BT, DBT etc. of Mongolia 
Anhwa High School of Gyeonggi-do, the Republic of Korea v. the School 73 of Ulaanbaatar, 
Mongolia 
In this part, the BTL project of the Republic of Korea and BT, DBT and so on of Mongolia 
for educational facilities is compared, since BTL is now widely used for education facilities in the 
South Korea and, in Mongolia, 18 BT-type concessions in school construction were concluded in 
2016. Moreover, 28 out of 39 signed contracts between 2011-2016 were BT-type. Importantly, 
no build and lease type of concession contracts have been found for social infrastructures from 
the available concession contracts on the website of the National Development Agency of 
Mongolia.  
The Anhwa High School in Hwaseong in Gyeonggi-do, Korea, was built in 2007 and is 
considered one of the more successful BTL contracts. On the other hand, School 73 at the 
Bayangol district of Ulaanbaatar city is the one of the first runner education PPP projects in 
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Mongolia, and was opened in September 2017. Below are the specifics of the contracts with 
explanations as follows: 
Table 9 A comparative snapshot and short analysis of Anhwa High School and 73th School 
concessions 
Factors/Names Anhwa High School 73 th School 
PPP type Build-transfer-lease Demolish-build-transfer 
Project type New construction New construction 
Region/district General residential district General residential district 
Scale 5 stories above ground 3 stories above ground 
Number of students 1050 960 
Construction cost KW 15,536 million  USD 4,836,919.0 
Duration of 
contracts 
20 years 
Fixed price, output-based contract 
3 years  
Quality guarantee During the contract term i.e. 20 years 
Better ensures higher quality and 
improved performance. 
3 years 
Quality of a school only has to meet the 
state norms and standards. Moreover, 3 
years of quality guarantee could not 
incentivize a concessionaire to promote 
long-term quality guarantee. 
Performance 
monitoring 
The concessionaire is responsible for 
the whole life maintenance of the 
project for a duration of 20 years. The 
operating shareholder is in charge of an 
integrated management system for 
buildings and performance monitoring. 
After the construction period, a multi-
layer monitoring of operations has been 
at place (Table 11). In other words, 20 
years of performance guarantee is 
provided through output based 
payment.  
Consequently, a whole life cycle costing 
and performance based payments 
incentivize the concessionaire to 
promote quality and sophisticated 
performance monitoring. This 
mechanism seems compatible with the 
theoretical rationales of PPPs in terms of 
increased added value through shared 
burden, mutual monitoring based on 
After the completion of construction, 
the state commission inspects whether 
the quality meets the state standards 
and norms and gives permission to use 
by the public. Moreover, an inspection 
manager who shall be paid by a 
concessionaire of 2% of the total project 
cost has the authority and responsibility 
for monitoring of the quality of ongoing 
construction during the construction 
phase. It is a questionable mechanism 
since the inspection engineer is paid by 
a concessioner, thus it could create 
conflicts of interests. Also, it should be 
highlighted that no particular 
responsibility is mentioned for an 
inspection engineer in the case of any 
failures, quality defects and other 
problems. This unaccountable 
mechanism could create disincentives 
and free riding problems on the part of 
42 
 
performance indicators.  an inspection engineer.   
Consequently, quality promotion and 
performance monitoring are not 
incentivized by BT. 
Government 
support/payment 
 
The competent authority is responsible 
for land provision and lease payments 
over 20 years.  
Consequently, BTL creates smooth and 
dispersed burdens on a budget over 20 
years. But, a special regulation is 
applicable to BTL since they still creates 
the burden on a budget. 
A lump sum payment for two years after 
the completion of the project shall be 
made. 
Consequently, it is clear that BT type 
creates a sudden and sharp burden on 
the Government budget. No specific 
regulation is implemented for BT, which 
could enable political opportunities and 
unplanned PPPs to take place. 
Risk sharing Construction, financing and operation 
risks lie on the private partner, financing 
risk is on the public sector. 
Construction risk is on the private 
partner, financing and operation risks 
are on the public sector. 
Source: Jay-Hyung Kim et all., Volume 2, 2011 and the Concession contract between the Government of Mongolia 
and “Monkon Construction”, 2016 
The following problems could be highlighted based on the comparison of two PPPs 
types of educational facility:  
The BT type could negatively influence on the overall quality, performance, fiscal 
stability and it is also difficult to see if the BT-type would give a better VfM due to the absence 
of VfM analysis for PPPs in Mongolia. The issue of discount rate for BT, its suitability and 
efficiency is ambiguous and less clear too since no comparison has been made between PPPs 
and PSCs. 
 
 
 
Figure 11 A comparison of BTL and BT  
Source: Jay-Hyung Kim et all., Volume 2, 2011 and self-adopted. 
Table 10 Payment of investment of 73th School 
№ Payment amount in USD Years of 
Payment 
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Source: The Concession contract between the Government of Mongolia and “Monkon Construction”, 2016 
Table 11 Result of Value for Money Test and Monitoring of Operations at Anhwa High School 
 
Source: Jay-Hyung Kim et all., Volume 2, 2011 
Summary of comparison of BTL of the Republic of Korea v. BT, DBT etc. of Mongolia 
In general, it could be concluded that the BT-type project is highly contract driven and 
has too few elements of genuine partnership due to the limited financial burden and 
operational risk sharing for better quality and higher efficiency. But the good thing in 
connection to that is BT types trigger less transaction costs for negotiations and contracting 
since most of the BT contracts were barely over 10 pages and concessionaires get back their 
investment within 2-3 years plus interest. This benefit becomes more convincing, due to 
arguments of Vining and Boardman, who examined that PPPs contracting cost is complex and 
often very high (Graeme p 170). Therefore, BTL might require higher transaction costs and be 
more complex to implement in comparison to the BT-type projects of Mongolia, where the 
collaboration between the state and the private sector is still underdeveloped and whose 
human and material capitals could be greatly challenged for advanced PPP types such as BTL. It 
is evident that BTL type of PPPs is sustainable and guarantees higher level of efficiency and 
 1 3,385,843.3 2017 
 2 1,451,075.7 2018 
Sum 4,836,919.0 - 
№ Category Costs in USD 
1 Demolish 143,769.0 
2 Build 3,904,793.0 
3 Interest  788,358 
Sum  4,836,919.0 
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quality guarantee compared to the BT-type. However, a through development of guidelines and 
rules concerning the proper implementation of BTL, capacity building of not only public but also 
private sectors for the proper implementation should be the prerequisites of application of BTL 
type in Mongolia. Otherwise, BTL also simply might not work as it has done so in a developed 
country such as the Republic of Korea, which has a high level of human and material capitals 
and a mature PPP market.  
 
Comparison of BTO of the Republic of Korea v. BOT, BOO, DBOO, DBOT etc. of Mongolia 
There were 11 BOT, BOO, DBOO, DBOT and other similar types of signed contracts 
(except 28 BT types) in the website of the National Development Agency, in Mongolia as of 
2017.  All the relevant general details of these agreements could be found in the Annex table 
that summarizes all 39 signed concession contracts. 11 concession contracts of the build-
operate type are summarized below, by dividing them in to two dimensions, namely: 
Categories  Public infrastructure Public infrastructure ? 
State involved price setting      7    0 
Market based tariff setting 3 - Worth discussing since a 
market based mechanism is 
applicable for public 
infrastructures 
1 - Questionable to be 
implemented through PPPs 
arrangements since does not 
concern public infrastructures, but 
manufacturing of processed ore 
Below is given the short description of 8 (7+1) projects, excluding 3 projects that apply 
market based pricing mechanism. 
- Promotion of a whole life costing approach for 
the increased added value and efficiency 
- Performance indicators with sophisticated back 
up monitoring over the whole cycle of PPPs for a 
high quality provision of public services 
- various kinds of risks are shared in a 
proportional way 
- Although, BTL might require higher transaction 
costs and specific contexts to be successful such 
as well educated human capital, institutions  
 
The Republic of 
Korea-BTL  
- Could not promote a whole life costing 
approach for increased quality, 
performance, innovation and efficiency 
-Quality, performance, fiscal stability, 
proper risk sharing  are not well promoted 
- Not clear whether BT could promote an 
added value than PSC due to a lack of VfM 
evaluation and application of ambiguous 
discount rates 
- Although, BT can be simple to implement 
and less trigger higher transaction costs in 
less developed contexts  
 
 
Mongolia-BT, DBT 
etc. 
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Table 12 A short description of 8 PPPs that apply the State involved price setting  
1- Market based tariff setting /Only 
one project for manufacturing of 
processed ore/ 
7-  Regulated tariffs and prices /All 7 projects are  
      public infrastructures/ 
 
Mining Metallurgy Complex 
(RBOT, BT for road) is a huge 
project that concerns renovating 
the old ore plant for increasing 
its capacity, mining ore site for 
inputs and building an electricity 
transmission line, the railway, 
and a paved road to connect the 
Complex to the nearest 
transportation channels.  While 
leaving aside all the detailed 
duties, the main duties and rights 
of the concessionaire are the 
exclusive right to use the old 
plant and ore mining deposits at 
the same time, and expanding 
the old plant; producing and 
selling processed ore in the 
domestic and international 
markets. The price could be 
established freely according to 
the concessionaire’s decisions as 
long as it complies general laws 
that regulate fair business 
practices.  
 
 
- The tariffs of concession items of 5 projects namely, Tuul 
Songino water reserve complex (BOO); Telmen thermal 
power station (BOT); The Fifth combined heat and power 
plant (DFBOM) and the state fuel reserve warehouse (BOO); 
and the Power station electricity transmission line at Uvs 
aimag (DFBOT), the tariffs/prices shall be determined by the 
agreement with the relevant authorities or in some cases 
with relevant SOEs. /back-up or ex post price setting/. Also, 
most of the contracts oblige the state to buy the 
electricity/services so that ensure the stable revenue for 
concessioners.  
- One health project of Building of an incomplete hospital 
(ROT) concession contract has to be continuously financed 
according to the same benchmark with State integrated 
medical hospitals by the State. The performance indicators 
are concerned about bed numbers such as 260 beds, also 
about the creation of the medical operating environment 
such as equipping, furnishing for the proper operation that 
shall be in compliance with the state norms in general. Other 
than that, there are no specific indicators backed up with 
continues monitoring was required.  
- Finally, the only BOT paved road project of Nariinsukhait-
Shiveehuren, where the toll has to be established according 
to the agreement with the relevant authority and the 
concessionaire. And the concessionaire has the obligation to 
remain the toll fee constant during the concession term.  
 
 
   
Overall, a state involved pricing policy was applicable to 7 projects, that were concerned 
with the public interest. The main drawback that could have effects later on the public interest 
is the application of an ex post price setting mechanism that is not based on a proper analysis.  
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An exception to this is that there is one project, which is concerned about the 
manufacturing of processed ore and selling it on the domestic and international markets and 
where ideally, a price should be established according to the market-based mechanism. 
However, it is not considered a public infrastructure project. Thus, the free pricing policy of this 
concession could be self-explanatory. On the other hand, it is really questionable that a project 
which is not a public infrastructure project could be implemented through the PPP 
arrangement. This is because in this example, industrial and PPP policy are mixed and a special 
one entity is given competitive privileges and monopoly rights. The further implications of this 
question is beyond this thesis content. However, at this point, the one thing that should be 
highlighted is that there is a problem of mixing industrial and PPP policies. This mixing might 
have some distortive outcomes in both industrial and infrastructure sectors, which caution that 
the PPP policy might be easily used opportunistically in other sectors.  
Also, the reason given for applying not BTL or lease type, but instead ROT or operation-
type of contract that is used for profit-generating projects, to the health project is not clear. 
Thus, this is again another distortion of a proper PPP type application. 
 Now, 3 other projects that use the free market pricing policy, although they are 
infrastructure projects that are concerned with the public interest to some extent, would be 
analyzed in detail.  This is due to the fact that, the 3 projects, namely, a museum, a health 
complex and a railway, are services that are traditionally provided by the state. Currently, the 
provision of these services has various flexible market oriented PPPs arrangements. Also, these 
3 projects would be compared with the South Korean Rail project in order to identify gaps and 
issues in their PPP practice.  
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Table 13 A comparative snapshot and short analysis of Korean BTO v. Mongolian BOT, DBOO, DBOT  
          A Korean case Mongolian cases 
Factors/names Light Rail Transit of 
New Bundang Line 
/2007/ 
Mongolian 
Nationality Museum 
/2015/ 
Human Development 
Complex /2014/ 
Railway base structure between 
Erdenet and Ovoot mine /2015/ 
PPP type BTO DBOO BOT DBOT  
Project type New construction New construction New construction New construction 
Region/district Seoul Metropolitan 
area 
Residential area Ulaanbaatar and 
Arkhangai province 
The railway shall be the basis for 
the economic corridor between 
Europe and Asia, namely the 
Russian Federation and the 
People’s Republic of China. Also, it 
shall enable transportation of 
mines from Khuvsgul, Bulgan, 
Orkhon provinces to the borders of 
Mongolia. 
Scale 12.7 km  Not specified in the 
concession contact 
Not specified in the 
concession contact 
542 km railway base structure 
The demand 
forecast 
Traditional 4-Step 
Model of 
Transportation 
Demand was used. 
Also, estimation of 
commuters by station 
using Emme/3, 
TransCAD, etc. 
Estimated traffic 
assignment result: 
Upbound 117/630 
and downbound 
32083/109372 
Not specified in the 
concession contact 
Not specified in the 
concession contact 
Not specified in the concession 
contact 
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trip/days 
Total investment 
cost 
KRW 1,551.1 Billion  USD 125 million  Not specified in the 
contract 
Not specified in the contract 
Duration of 
contracts 
30 20 30 30 
Quality 
guarantee 
30 20 30 30 
Performance 
monitoring 
Specified 
performance 
indicators through 
minimum operation 
intervals were 
required. 
Concessionaire has 
to do the 
maintenance by 
their own cost and 
report to the 
relevant competent 
authority including 
financial reports 
annually. No specific 
performance 
indicators were 
mentioned in the 
contract. 
Concessionaire has to 
report concerning the 
construction, operation 
and maintenance 
performances to the 
relevant competent 
authority annually.  
Otherwise, no specific 
PPPs performance 
indicators were reflected 
in the contract. 
Concessionaire has to report 
regarding construction and 
operation, except financial reports 
to the relevant competent 
authority annually.  
Moreover, meeting the capacity of 
transportation of 22.2 million tons 
per year of cargo was stated in the 
contract. 
Government 
support/payment 
Financial aid of KRW 
566 billion was 
granted during the 
construction period 
(i.e. 49.8% of total 
project cost); 
Support for Toll Fee 
Discount; Aid for 
other administrative 
costs, EX-risks were 
Transfer of all 
exhibitions; and no 
financial aid except 
land and all other 
necessary permits 
for construction and 
operation were 
granted. 
Neither sharing of 
risks for 
No financial aid except 
land and all other 
necessary permits for 
construction and 
operation were granted. 
Not to give permission to 
build similar function 
complexes and to provide 
similar services within the 
area to any state related 
No financial aid from the GOM was 
granted but all necessary permits 
for construction and operation 
licenses were granted. Pre-emptive 
right to implement the Expansion 
of the Base Structure and 
monopoly right to possess, use and 
manage the Base structure and the 
Land Strip were granted.  
The right to use the Base Structure 
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granted.  construction and 
operation phases, 
not sharing of 
excess profits nor 
losses are regulated. 
organizations/companies 
was ensured. 
Neither sharing of risks 
for construction and 
operation phases, not 
sharing of excess profits 
nor losses are regulated.  
and to carry out solely railway 
transportation operation as well as 
various stability privileges such as 
law and tax were ensured. 
Usage fee The financial aid was 
used to retain the toll 
fee at the proper 
level. Moreover, the 
concessionaire 
requested the 
Government to 
support for toll fee 
discount through 
request for financial 
aid in case of free 
rides and passenger 
discounts excluding 
student discounts.  
Market mechanism 
based principles are 
applicable. 
Market mechanism based 
principles are applicable 
for tariffs except for 
people with disability, 
elderly people, low 
income people and 
people in need of 
rehabilitation treatment, 
whose specific tariffs shall 
be reflected in a separate 
contract which further 
shall be approved by the 
competent authority. 
Concessionaire has the right to set 
and change the tariffs 
independently based on market 
principles within the scope of the 
Laws (such as Competition Law) 
Responsibility for 
contracts 
The SPC for the 
project is responsible 
for the concession 
contract.   
This promotes a 
greater risk sharing 
and a single point 
responsibility, which 
promotes mutual 
monitoring between 
The Concessionaire 
is responsible for 
the concession 
contract. 
 
This promotes a 
single point 
responsibility. 
The Concessionaire is 
responsible for the 
concession contract. 
 
This promotes a single 
point responsibility. 
Three companies one from 
Australia and two from the 
Republic of China established a 
consortium for the sole purpose of 
the PPP contract execution. 
However, companies are not jointly 
or severally liable for any 
provisions as set out within the 
agreement. A single point 
accountability, mutual risk sharing 
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investors, executers 
and managers. 
and monitoring is not promoted 
from a theoretical perspective. 
Source: Kangsoo Kim, 2017; concession contracts. 
 
Figure 12 Operational system of PPPs  
 
 
Source: Jay-Hyung Kim et all., Volume 2, 2011 
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Summary of the comparison of BTO of the Republic of Korea v. 3 BOT, BOO, DBOO projects of 
Mongolia 
In the Korean BTO project, the Korean Government greatly shared the financial risks 
through investments and MRGs based on demand estimation, in order to maintain the quality 
and appropriate user fees due to the nature of transportation for public use. However, in the 
Mongolian BOO, BOT, DBOO projects, the GOM did not share the financial burdens and 
concessionaires bore the full financial burden. In these cases, the GOM aimed more for creating 
an excellent business friendly environment for concessionaires such as promptly granting land 
use rights, all other necessary permits and licenses for construction and operation, favorable 
taxes, and monopoly rights over concession items. In line with that, PPPs performance indicators 
were not precisely dictated by the GOM, but generally stated that, the quality of concessions 
should satisfy the State standards and norms. Concerning the prices, the considered three 
Mongolian cases explicitly stated that the prices would be determined independently by 
concessionaires, according to the market economy principles.   
This fact might also be connected with a lack of proper prior determined performance 
indicators through ex ante CBAs by relevant authorities. For instance, in the case of the 
Mongolian Human Development Centre, service conditions for the target group (elderly, 
disadvantaged, low income and people-in-need-of-rehabilitative-treatment) and the 
relevant user fees should be determined by an accompanying contract to the main concession 
contract. This ex post contracting mechanism also could be seen from this concession contract 
which states that, “…the GOM will decide to provide supports based on relevant competent 
authority’s proposals if that is necessary for the execution of the concession contract 
successfully…”.  In other words, in the Mongolian Human Development Centre case, the 
concession contract set the framework of the concession, where detailed issues such as the 
GOM supports and details of fees and service conditions for the target group would be further 
determined by the accompanying contracts based on the level of necessity. That was the reverse 
condition in the Korean case, where the Government shared financial burdens, negotiated and 
determined all necessary performance indicators, level of government support and user fees 
with the concessionaire in concession contracts. 
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In infrastructure PPPs, governments usually retain various controls over quality and 
tariffs due to the nature of providing public services and due to natural monopoly characteristics 
of services provisions (World Bank, 2004). These interventions by governments are possible with 
the provision of guarantees that are enough to ensure the profitability and profit motives of 
private parties, which was the practice in the Republic of Korea. However, a new trend of non-
interventionist price setting and other performance indicators that do not dictate PPP policy 
have been observed based on the analysis of the 3 cases of museum, health center (where the 
price was regulated only for the target group), and the railway in Mongolia. This marked a new 
trend which had created some doubts over its true purpose since monopoly rights were granted 
for just specific infrastructures that had some level of public interest. 
Rui Sousa Monteiro claims that although PPPs are contractual in nature, they present special 
characteristics due to their link to public services, and there is a strong need to emphasize and 
reinforce mechanisms for the identification of the public interest (Graeme A Hodge et all., p.275, 
2010). Importantly, the trend in developing countries, particularly in water PPPs, has revealed 
that larger parts of investments are funded by public money, and private operators are more 
involved in the service and operational phases in order to ensure better efficiency and public 
interest (World Bank, 2009). The Republic of Korea applies a VfM based PPPs policy, where costs, 
benefits, demand, public and private interests are altogether considered for the most optimal 
solution for the increased social welfare in contrast to Mongolian lazy faire approach.  
It is difficult to say that Mongolian build-operate type concessions that transfer the huge 
risks namely design, construction, maintenance and operation risks to private parties while 
enabling concessionaires to freely manage prices and quality is a socio-economically balanced 
approach that is sustainable under different conditions.  
Particularly, the following trends were observed for these 3 Mongolian PPPs: 
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Conceptual and policy analysis  
 Confusion about the concept; confusion about the preferable types of PPPs due to 
application of too many types, improper types of PPPs (BT) 
The meaning and concept of PPP 
Erik-Hans Klijn mentioned that there were three confusions around PPPs (Graeme A 
Hodge et all, p.68, 2010). First is the confusion about the meaning of PPPs. The second is the 
confusion about the argumentations and rationality of PPPs since it is still inconclusive in terms 
of whether PPPs do give value for money, efficiency, innovation and social welfare in general. 
The third is the confusion about what the preferable or best form is that PPPs should take. All of 
these three confusions have been not clarified at the PPP policy and practice level in Mongolia.  
According to scholars, PPP is a rich, attractive and ambiguous concept that is, especially if 
it is not precisely defined in terms of its meaning and application, could be an advantageous 
mechanism for politicians. For instance, Erik-Hans Klijin claims that the PPP is a (political) brand 
(Graeme A Hodge et all, p.68, 2010). Also, Hodge and Greve suggest that “…the ‘PPP language 
game’ fits the modern public sector like a glove and has acquired higher political legitimacy that 
the culture of competition through contracting or coordination through bureaucratic 
arrangements.” Also, they claim that the richness in the meaning and concept simply signal its 
theoretical ineffectiveness (Graeme A Hodge et all, 2010).  
- Interventionest 
- Efficiency and public interest 
based user fees, performance 
indicators and greater risk 
sharing of the Governmnet 
with the private partner  
-Public interest and efficiency 
based 
The Republic of Korea-BTO  
-Non-interventionest for price setting 
- No financial burden sharing except 
creation of an excellent business 
environmet and granting of a 
monopoly right 
- The concessionaire has the right to 
independently decide on tariffs and 
performance indicators 
-Market principles based and profit 
oriented 
 
Mongolia-BOT, BOO and DBOO 
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The Concession Law of Mongolia flexibly defines the meaning of ‘concession’5 and applicable 
infrastructure types as ‘infrastructures and social services’. It not only lists more than 7 PPP 
types in technical and descriptive ways, but also approves the usage of any other types of PPPs 
depending on the context (Articles 3, 4, Concession Law of Mongolia, 2010). It is clear from the 
Law that the broadness and impreciseness of the PPP meaning, PPP types and applicable 
infrastructures have been generously created. As seen from the practices of Mongolia, too many 
types of PPPs have been used for not only public infrastructures but also for industrial 
complexes such as mining complexes. Paved road projects, as well, used various types of BT and 
BOT.  
On the other hand, in the Republic of Korea, the conceptual ambiguity, PPP types and 
applicable infrastructures are clarified for greater accountability. The Korean Act on Public 
Private Partnership in Infrastructure (hereinafter referred to as the PPP Act) lists the precise 
infrastructures by sectors with the relevant laws that they belong to for a greater legal certainty. 
Also, the applicable types of PPPs for various projects are clearly defined, namely the BTO for 
user fee-type contracts and BTL for service-type of contracts. It should be emphasized that the 
BTL type for non-profit generating infrastructures was added only from 2005 where BTO (BOT, 
BOO) type that is for profit generating infrastructures has been in use for many years in Korea.  
Table 14 Characteristics of procurement types of the Republic of Korea 
 
Source: Comprehensive National Basic Plan, 2011 
                                                 
5 A ”concession” means an exclusive right to possess, operate, create and renovate state and local own property 
assets for the purposes of rendering basic social and infrastructure services to the public on the basis of an 
agreement on conditions and terms specified in this law (Concession Law, 2010).  
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In that way, the PPP concept, types and applicable infrastructures are clarified at the 
policy and application levels through the relevant legal acts by defining the infrastructures and 
applicable PPP types in detail. 
PPP and Concession 
The meanings of PPP and concessions are studied here, since these terminologies are 
interchangeably used in legal documents as well as in practices in Mongolia, which also creates 
another confusion (State Policy on PPP, Concession Law of Mongolia). The main reason of 
writing so much about the terminologies and definitions is connected with financial accounting 
and reporting obligations related to PPPs, where a gap and uncertainty could further create 
fiscal instability and political maneuvering spaces.  
In general, common definitions for PPPs range from concession-based financing arrangements to 
institutional PPPs. Such institutional PPPs comprise mixed ownership structures involving public 
and private joint ownership (E.R. Yescombe, 2007; Graeme A Hodge et all., 2010). Other models 
involve a ‘special purpose vehicle’, straight project finance arrangements under long-term 
contractual arrangements between the public and private sectors to provide a service for the 
term of the contract. According to the experiences of developing countries, for instance Latin 
America initially focused on attracting private funding and therefore adopted more the 
concession scheme. However, many countries departed from this approach due to early 
termination of concessions which showed their inherent vulnerabilities in the volatile economic 
environment of developing countries (World Bank 2009). Many countries then opted for mixed-
ownership companies approach or long-term PPPs that combined private operation with public 
investment and management contracts, and leases (World Bank, 2009). As such, there is a 
possibility that some of the Mongolian long-term concession contracts that do not provide 
various subsidies, public grants, and cross-subsidies might be vulnerable to early terminations 
due to economic volatilities.  
This ‘special purpose vehicle’ type is used in Korea, where generally, construction 
companies, financial investors, and professional operators form an SPC for the respective PPP 
project (Jay-Hyung Kim et all., Volume 2, 2011; Article 14, PPP Act, 2005). The PPP Act uses 
‘concession agreement’ and ’concessionaire’ when indicating contracts concerning private 
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investment projects and corporations who conclude contracts and invest in infrastructure. Korea 
provides various grants, investments for lowering tariffs in order to balance the public interest 
aspects of PPPs. Although current Mongolian practice of using the terminology of ‘concession’ 
seems acceptable in its current use, the concession for ‘what kind of infrastructures, what types 
of concessions, what kind of policy for retaining the public interest in PPPs’ should be more 
clearly elaborated for better accountability and certainty in the Concession Law. 
Could BT type be a concession type?  
As said before, PPP is a general term which expresses long-term contracts where an owner 
purchases a stream of services over the concession period rather than simply upon the provision 
of an asset (E.R.Yescombe, 2007). In these projects, a government contracts with a one-party 
SPV and payments are based either on direct payment from consumers through toll or via 
payment system from government, based on performance. The main rationale of the PPP model 
is the belief that the inclusion of a SPV’s own finance motivates better efficiency. Concession 
contracts must run for a period equal to the time it takes for the private party to regain the 
investment. This is the main reason of long duration of PPPs (Graeme A Hodge et all., p.217, 
2010). The public partner concentrates on defining the objectives to be attained in terms of 
public interest, quality of services provided and pricing policy, and it takes responsibility for 
monitoring compliance with these objectives. The PPP contract focuses on needs and functions, 
and it must be built on trust and transparency through open books and cooperation between 
parties (Graeme A Hodge et all., 2010).  
Consequently, the Mongolian BT could not meet any of the characteristics of concessions and it 
did not create any of the benefits that are considered as the main rationales of PPPs. BT type of 
contracts are not necessarily implemented through the Concession Law. The study conducted by 
Global Green Growth Institute suggested removing BT type of projects from the Concession Law 
since it is not considered a PPP, neither does it involve the private sector in the operational 
phase and it creates a fiscal risk (Global Green Growth Institute, 2016). Therefore, while it is 
definitely important to change the BT type, it should be taken into consideration that in order to 
transfer from the current BT practices to a more complex and sophisticated PPP practices such 
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as BTL, a time for adaptability for institution, time is needed for capacity building and taking 
legal measures for prevention from fiscal risks. 
 Misperception that the private sector is the best (No use of VfM) position to handle all 
infrastructure projects; thus there is a lack of policy concerning what government 
functions, infrastructures could be delegated and implemented by PPPs 
It is obvious from the Mongolian practices and policy that the private sector is the most 
preferred for all infrastructure development. There is no requirement to conduct any analysis to 
check how best the private sector is in comparison to public procurement. Whereas, in Korea, 
the PPP Act not only lists all eligible infrastructures precisely, but also the procurement principle 
states that it is ‘not only for PPP’ (Kangsoo Kim, 2017). In line with this principle, a VfM analysis 
is used to compare the NPV of PSC and PFI for confirming the suitability of a PPP (Article 7, 
Enforcement Decree of the PPP Act). A VfM is a comparative assessment of PCS and PFI, where 
the PSC is used in Korea for the benchmark costs (Jungwook Kim, 2017). The PSC has multi 
purposes and it promotes whole life costing early on in the project’s developments; assists in 
assessing the project affordability; and provides a means for demonstrating VfM; as well as 
encourages bidding competition (Jungwook Kim, 2017).  
Consequently, it could be seen that after years of government failures in Mongolia, it 
might have been easier to promote and accept that the private sector would be the best to carry 
out PPPs in politics and the society without hesitation. On the other side of this is that policy 
that is too biased towards the private sector has been implemented by ignoring the private 
sector accountability measures that are at the heart of the NPL such as embeddedness, carrot-
and-sticks and performance-based accountability mechanisms (Rodrik, 2004). In addition, this 
distorted view of the institutional transplantation of PPPs might have been not have been by 
chance or mistake. However, this could be a good opportunity for the Mongolian politicians and 
the private sector since they do not care about whole life costing, risk analysis, PFS and so on, 
that are vital for implementing a project that would give the best allocative efficiency. 
 Confusion about bundling and risk distribution; No government financial risk-sharing policy 
for balanced social and economic efficiency i.e. there is confusion about how to 
sustainably share risks and make PPPs more efficient in the long-run 
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The KDI study suggested that in order to effectively facilitate the implementation of 
privately-financed infrastructure projects, the GOM needs to make more fiscal investment for 
infrastructure provisions since many socially important projects might not ensure profitability 
and thus, attract private sectors (KDI, 2011). However, although, the Concession Law of 
Mongolia reflects favorable financial supports from the government, the PPP practice of 
Mongolia has revealed that the GOM participation has been limited in financial risk-sharing with 
the private sector. Only one electricity project was an exception where minimum revenue was 
granted (Concession contract on the Fifth combined heat and power plant, 2014). 
 In contrast to Mongolian practice, the Basic Plan of Korea and its new risk-sharing 
mechanism are flexible to changing economic conditions. Basically, the idea is that the 
Government would share risks to the extent of protecting public interest if there are great public 
interest concerns. Including this, the Government would support a concessionaire in cases of 
financial difficulties with investments and share the excess profits in cases of excess profitability 
as stated in the contract (Basic Plan, 2011).  
Figure 13 A new risk sharing mechanism of the Republic of Korea 
 
 
Source: Comprehensive National Basic Plan, 2011 
However, the case analysis of Mongolia shows the GOM implementing a hands-off 
approach, specifically for some build-operate types of PPPs. This situation might have resulted 
due to the lack of proper ex ante analysis of projects bankability. Also, with this policy, if a 
project is socially highly desirable, but not highly profitable then this project could not proceed. 
In that case, the meaning of PPPs, of punctual provision and on budget delivery of required 
public services by supporting each other (public-private) through partnering, would be lost. It is 
difficult to say that Mongolian build-operate type PPPs that transfer huge risks - namely in 
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design, construction, maintenance and operation risks to private parties while enabling 
concessionaires to freely manage prices and quality - is a socio-economically balanced approach 
that might be sustainable under different conditions. Consequently, a balanced risk sharing 
mechanism should be implemented for the increased involvement of private sectors to 
participate in not profitable though socially desirable projects.  
 
 No short and long-term PPPs integrated policies, planning that is compatible with the fiscal 
policy and development priorities and that is adaptable to the changing socio-economic 
conditions  
The PPP policy and practices of Korea are further elaborated through the PPP Act 
Enforcement Decrees, the Comprehensive National Basic Plan and various other guidelines and 
standard documents.  According to the PPP Act, the Korean Government should formulate and 
announce a Basic Plan for private participation in infrastructure to accommodate greater public 
convenience, raise the competitiveness of Korean industry, and encourage a balanced 
development of the national territory (Article 7, PPP Act, 2005). The Basic Plan is annually 
updated, and it is adaptable to the changing socio-economic conditions within the general 
principles and frameworks of the main PPP law (Basic Plan, 2011). The Basic Plan provides PPP 
policy directions, details in PPP project implementation procedure, financing and re-financing 
directions, risk allocation mechanism, payment scheme of government subsidy, documentation 
direction and so on (Jongyearn Lee, 2017, Basic Plan, 2011). The Basic Plan is about 112 pages 
long, highly sophisticated policy document which provides detailed information for the clear, 
transparent, consistent and accountable implementation of PPPs.  
As seen above, at the implementation level a VFM test is used for selecting suitable 
projects for PPPs. This test checks not only whether it is better to implement a project through 
PPPs or not, but also this test enables the selection of most efficiently allocated project that is 
compatible with the broader socio-economic policy of the country. A VFM test has the following 
phases (Jungwook Kim, 2017): 
Phase 1: Feasibility study (Decision to invest-CBA is conducted from a national economy 
perspective) 
60 
 
Phase 2: VfM (Decision on PFI, where PSC and PFI are compared to assess whether the PFI 
achieves VfM) 
Phase 3: Formulation of PFI alternatives (The level of project cost, user fee, subsidy scale, etc. 
are suggested from the government) 
Phase 4: Award bonus points to the initial proponent 
 
Figure 14 Flowcharts of a VFM Test and PFS Analyses  
 
Source: Comprehensive National Basic Plan, 2011 
A VfM is carried out by a multi-disciplinary research team up to 6 months with constant 
interim review meetings and it is carried out in accordance with ‘Guidelines for implementation 
of VfM Test/Review of Proposal for unsolicited BTO projects’ (Jungwook Kim, 2017). The first 
step PFS is the most important part where decision to proceed with the project is based on three 
analyses namely, economic analysis, policy analysis, balanced regional development analysis. It 
should be mentioned here that the PFS is a complex study and various well-developed guidelines 
and datasets are used, which are updated continuously through academic research. The 
economic analysis makes use of mainly CBA analysis. Here the rationale of conducting CBAs are 
to evaluate the attractiveness, economic feasibility and efficient allocation. Importantly, a CBA is 
not a pure technical tool, but thanks to that a project is able to become profitable by adjusting 
discount rates, duration and others. And, at the end all these three quantitative and qualitative 
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analyses are integrated by professionals and professors and analyzed through an overall 
evaluation method called Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP).  
VFM test of the Republic of Korea v. CBAs of Mongolia 
In Korea, through project appraisals namely through the phases of a VFM test, PPPs are 
able to become consistent with broader social, fiscal and economic policy objectives of the 
country. That is why a CBA is vital, though still only one component of the whole project 
appraisal process. 
In Mongolia, PPP projects that are compatible with the infrastructure development 
policies and priorities of Mongolia are included in the Concession List that is approved by the 
GOM. However, there is a need to prioritize and select the most efficiently allocative PPPs due 
to impossibility of implementing too many projects, with limited resources. On the contrary to 
Korea, the project selection process is unclear, not transparent and not accountable in Mongolia. 
For instance, many education projects were given to Huvsgul and Bayankhongor provinces, 
whereas many other provinces were not given a single project in 2016.. Thus, the current 
practice allows subjective decision making through the project appraisal and prioritization 
processes. The main point is that just using only a CBA is an insufficient estimation method for 
huge public infrastructure projects that have to be compatible with not only financial and 
economic but other broader social objectives. 
Here, two important differences is highlighted between the two countries. The first one 
refers to the challenges as the VfM test itself is a highly complex analysis where not only well -
established institutions, human resources, detailed guidelines are required but also reliable data 
for forecasting demand and revenues. These are all insufficiently developed in Mongolia. The 
second one refers to the beneficial aspect where by comparing the public or private project 
procurement options, the granting of PPPs legitimatized as well as the public sector would 
better understand various ways (better design, financing solutions, risk sharing etc.) to negotiate 
project issues with the private sector and come up with more efficient options. Consequently, it 
could be said that a CBA is not solely enough to promote efficiently allocative decisions.  
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Institutional framework analysis 
After the adoption of the Concession Law, the PPP Unit was established under the State 
Property Committee by the Prime Minister's Decree No. 31 of 7 April 2010. Responsibility over 
PPPs shifted from the State Property Committee to the Ministry of Economic Development in 
2012, and then to the Ministry of Industry after the Ministry of Economic Development was 
dissolved in 2014. In 2016, the PPP Unit was transferred to the newly established National 
Development Agency (NDA). Consequently, the Global Green Growth Institute analyzed that, 
there have been three major politically-driven, institutional changes since 2012 (the Global 
Green Growth Institute, 2016).  
It could be seen that because the PPP unit has never been independent from the political 
oversight, it has shifted in accordance with the political changes and with respective political 
interests. Here, the PPP concept itself enables flexibility for politicians to shift as they consider 
suitable or beneficial (since PPPs could be considered as state properties, economic policy tools, 
as investment related issue as well as a mechanism to foster development). Consequently, it is 
not difficult to make valid reasons for shifting the PPP Unit from place to place where it better 
suits more to the relevant political interests than the public interest. Otherwise, if public interest 
has been considered as more important than stability, capacity building, increasing efficiency 
and other similar issues should have been allocated more importance in consideration than the 
constant changes of the Unit and careless handling of the capacity of the Unit to their relative 
functions. Indeed, the constant institutional changes, the low capacity of the PPP Unit, and 
overly-broad functions of the PPP Unit were considered as one of the main reasons of inefficient 
implementation of the Concession Law (ICL, 2015). Consequently, the PPP Unit’s instability is no 
doubt self-explanatory in the light of the political instability as well as the Unit’s overly-broad 
functions in both managerial and policy related areas, might also be self-explanatory in light of 
the high political interests to hold control and the lack of political oversight in big infrastructure 
projects.  
Table 15 Institutional changes driven by political changes 
PPP policies Institutional change Political change 
Centralized PPPs 
policy both 
1. PPP Unit under the State Property Committee was established with the adoption of the 
Concession Law in 2010 
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management 
and policy 
functions at the 
PPP Unit 
 
2. PPP Unit under the Ministry of Economic Development 2012 
Parliamentary Election 
3. PPP Unit under the Ministry of Industry 2014 
Resignation/Establishment 
of a new Government 
4. PPP Unit under the newly established 
National Development Agency, which affiliates directly 
to the Office of the Prime Minister 
2016 
Parliamentary Election 
PPPs 
Decentralization 
policy /ongoing/ 
5. PPPs Decentralization and Financial Centralization policy 
the Ministry of Finance shall control financial issues; 
otherwise all PPPs are now responsibility of each line 
ministries/local/central governments 
2017 
Resignation/Establishment 
of a new Government 
Next is a critical analysis of the two PPPs policies since the same PPP Unit-based 
centralized policy was implemented from 2010-2016 and a significant policy shift from the 
centralized PPP policy to policy of decentralization and financial centralization is now ongoing. 
Centralized PPPs policy under the National Development Agency 
The NDA, where the PPP Unit belongs, is a Government Agency that affiliates directly to 
the Office of the Prime Minister. The reasons of resignation of the Prime Minister in 2017 have 
been connected to PPP-related issues. The PPP Unit is obviously not an independent and 
separate from the political oversight. The interconnection and political influences is as follow: 
the PPP Unit prepares the List of Concessions (although based on the proposals of line ministries 
and central/local governments) for the approval by the GOM; the PPP Unit organizes the 
procurement process and monitors the GOM’s approved PPPs; the PPP Unit develops guidelines 
and tendering documents which are approved by the GOM and so on, making it quite obvious 
that independent check and balance mechanism has not been in place for PPPs. 
The NDA aims to attract 70% of the whole investment from private capital for 
development related projects (Resolution of the Prime Minister №64, 2016). In that sense, the 
PPP Unit was established as a ‘little’ sub-division of the Integrated Investment Unit of the 
Agency in 2016. In the past, line ministries used to develop infrastructure policies, projects 
based on the development priorities of Mongolia as well as on their own demand. However, the 
current PPP Unit under the NDA was supposed to make a cross-sectoral coordination for the 
coherent infrastructure development in Mongolia and address the separated planning of 
infrastructure projects that used to be in practice before. For this, this main rationale of the PPP 
64 
 
Unit is that a centralized PPP policy should be implemented and management now has to be 
shifted to a PPP policy decentralization and financial centralization approach due to financial 
problems as explained before.  
PPP Decentralization and Financial Centralization policy /ongoing/ 
Lately, various many solutions to address the previous failures, and fiscal risks have been 
discussed. In connection to that, the Draft Amendment Law of Concession Law was proposed to 
the Parliament of Mongolia. The Parliament approved the Amendment Law of Concession Law in 
2017 (Media and Public Relations Department, Parliament of Mongolia, 2017). Consequently, 
centralized PPP policy development and concession management at the PPP Unit scheme now 
has to be changed according to the Amendment Law of the Concession Law. No mention was 
made concerning BT type, VFM at the Amendment Law of the Concession Law. 
Now the line ministries and local and central governments are responsible for the 
development and procurement of their concessions, and conducting respective CBAs. Line 
ministries now have to prepare a financial analysis about the financial aspects of the best 
concession proposal according to the Debt Management Law. The MOF in its turn, based on 
Budget, Budget Sustainability and the Debt Management Laws, gives permission to line 
ministries to send their proposals to the GOM for including in the Concession List (Amendment 
Law of Concession Law, 2017).  
Namely, the following two documents below are to be prepared and approved for a 
concession in order to be included in the Concession List for the GOM approval (the Amendment 
Law to the Concession Law): 
1. Line ministries have to submit to the MOF CBAs and economic/financial analysis of 
PPP proposals according to the Debt Management Law  
2. Permission from the MOF based on CBAs and economic/financial analysis of line 
ministries 
Unsolicited projects as well as, now need to go through line ministries and then again, 
through the same procedures, the solicited projects would apply to get approval and to be 
included in the Concession List.  Consequently, now the MOF has the main responsibility for 
concessions and would then decide whether to give permission based on the fiscal risks 
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reflected in the Budget and Debt Management laws for fiscal sustainability. The MOF is also 
responsible for developing and approving the methodology on CBAs.  
The line ministries themselves are now responsible for procurement of concessions i.e. 
concluding concession contracts and monitoring their respective PPPs. Also, private parties have 
to submit monitoring reports every three months, according to the relevant Procedural rules to 
the line ministries and line ministries, to the MOF in order to obtain continued financing of their 
PPPs. In short, the financial aspects of PPPs are now centralized at the MOF for better fiscal 
stability and oversight and the PPP procurement and management are decentralized at line 
ministries and the respective government level for the efficient handling of PPP contracts and 
monitoring. 
The main drawback of this Amendment Law is that the consistency, integrated policy and 
management of PPPs are lost. Previously, the PPP Unit has the obligation to implement the 
Concession Law, but now this responsibility has been decentralized and practically no one now, 
is in charge of integrated and consistent implementation of the Concession Law. This policy 
might lead to inefficient solutions due to an overly-generalized Concession Law and the lack of 
other PPP policy guiding documents. In other words, the PPP policy has shifted from over-
centralization to over-decentralization for the solution of fiscal problems. Although, it should 
also be mentioned here that although the previous regulation obliged the PPP Unit to 
implement the Concession Law in integrated and coordinated way, the PPP Unit has not 
implemented the Concession Law as required. 
To sum up, now the PPP policy tends to be overly-concerned with only financial aspects 
in a biased way, and ignores other vital aspects of PPP policy such as research and development, 
integrated policy development and implementation, training, capacity building, collaboration 
and so on.  
Would fiscal discipline be reached through this policy and institutional change? 
 The institutional aspects of PPPs financial oversight in comparison to the Korean 
experience are studied. The KDI study based on their own experiences, suggested to Mongolia 
various estimation measures such as ex ante simplified PFS, Ex Officio Selection. These methods 
are used to prevent the overestimation of benefits and underestimation of the costs of line 
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ministries in Korea. In the past, line ministries’ own PPP analysis resulted in various difficulties 
and challenges in Korea. Thus, a new checks-and-balances mechanism has been initiated by 
establishing an independent PPP Unit PIMAC in Korea for promoting a transparent and 
accountable checks-and-balances mechanism.  
The MOSF is responsible for consistent project management, not only in terms of 
financing but also in terms of integrated PPP policy implementation. The MOSF develops and 
updates national PPP policies in accordance with higher-level national agenda and economic 
policy directions; coordinates sectoral PPP plans and establish comprehensive investment plans. 
It also importantly, coordinates sectoral PPP plans & establish comprehensive investment plans; 
acts as a Gatekeeper for big projects by approving major projects and monitoring their 
implementation process step by step (Jongyearn Lee, 2017). The PIMAC, an Independent PPP 
Unit conducts theoretical and policy research to help the MOSF to develop PPP policy; publishes 
detailed PPP implementation guidelines; and provides competent authorities with technical 
supports at every stage of project implementation. In addition, it provides capacity building 
programs for public and private sectors; and the most importantly the PIMAC conducts/reviews 
PFS of major projects that the MOSF is responsible for (Jongyearn Lee, 2017). In the past, line 
ministries have the ownership of PFS. However, due to this regulation, unfeasible projects could 
have proceeded, and the MOSF did used to change project budget without justification. 
Consequently, the PIMAC, an Independent unit reviews the PFS of line ministries and in the case 
of an unsolicited projects, conducts PFS for the MOSF for accountability, transparency and 
efficiency. 
 There is another Committee called Project Review Committee chaired by the MOSF. This 
Committee makes important decisions on PPP policies and major projects; for instance, a 
BTO(BTL) project that costs more than KRW 200(100) billion would be reviewed by the 
Committee; if necessary the Committee has an authority to postpone or block part of the 
expenditures for PPP projects (Kang Soo Kim, 2017). The Committee consists of members from 
procuring ministries and private sector experts. It could be seen that in Korea, there is a very 
layered, reliable and integrated PPP policy as well as a checks-and-balances mechanism. 
Figure 15 Procurement steps of the Republic of Korea 
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Source: Comprehensive National Basic Plan, 2011 
On the other hand, Mongolian PPP policy now lacks a checks-and-balances mechanism 
and an integrated and clear PPP policy like Korea has. It could be assumed that the Mongolian 
PPP policy is developed in such a way because the country lacks a capable and independent 
research institute to link PPP policy development with the review and control of the CBAs of the 
line ministries. But, there are various possible research institutes potentially that could be used 
for not only PPP policy development, but also for a check-and-control mechanism for the CBAs 
of line ministries and to help the MOF to negotiate and decide on costs of PPPs in a more 
informed way with line ministries. In general, a better solution must be found, otherwise the 
current overly-decentralized management of PPPs backed up by an unreliable, centralized 
financial control by the MOF not only fails to guarantee allocative efficiency but could also be 
easily used again for political opportunism.  
Moreover, now line ministries lack the respective expertise related to PPPs and are used 
to utilize the traditional procurement system which is a totally different management style from 
the PPP system. For instance, Boardman and Vining, based on the analysis of North American 
experiences, suggested that more important than the need for supportive legislative frameworks, 
was the need for strong and professional capacity inside the government to take on PPP deals 
(Graeme A Hodge et all, 2010). However, in Mongolia, line ministries, central and local 
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governments still lack the relevant expertise. In addition to that, there is now no integrated 
policy, a detailed implementation guidelines, nor a responsible body for training and others.  
In sum, it is highly doubtful that efficiently allocative PPPs would be reached through the 
current change in the PPP institution.  
Procurement framework analysis 
At the operational stage, policy and regulation should be directed to take measures that 
increase transparency, accountability, trust, clarity and decrease uncertainty, misunderstanding, 
asymmetry of information of the whole PPP and procurement process. Indeed, in the UK 
Heinecke’n report indicated “…PFI projects were inefficient due to protracted negotiations, 
unrealistic risk allocations, restrictive documentation and insufficient administrative systems to 
finalize tendering process…” (Graeme A Hodge et all., 2010).  The PPPs operational stage not 
only shall be wholly relay on detailed guidelines but also it should increase competition, 
innovation for fulfilling the rationale of PPPs. However, if we look at guidelines and rules related 
to PPPs of Mongolia, it is easily understandable that these documents are the minimum that are 
required for the operation of PPPs. Even it could be easily seen that these documents are quite 
old and not properly updated to changing socio-economic circumstances.  
These are: 
1. A Temporary Methodology for Cost-benefit Analysis, adopted by the Resolution No. 153 
2010 of the State Property Committee; - 9 pages including an example 
2. An Approval of the List of Concessions, adopted by the Resolution No 198 in 2010 and 
Resolution No. 317 in 2013 by the Government; 
3. Tendering Regulation of Concessions /Procedures on the selection of PPPs/, adopted by the 
Resolution No. 103 in 2012 by the Government; - 12 pages 
4. The Model Prequalification Document on Granting Concessions, the Model Request for 
Proposal Documents for Tender and the Tender Evaluation Guidelines were adopted as 
Annexes to the Resolution of No. 103 in 2012.- 11 pages 
5. A model concession contract, but this model contract warns that this model contract is 
subject to change according to the concession types and sectors. – 56 pages 
69 
 
Despite these documents, there are no other detailed guidelines for sector specific issues, 
technical estimations and so on. Many of the ground problems such as a lack of ex ante analysis, 
lack of conducting CBAs, a high level of cancellation of concession contracts, lack of monitoring 
and compliance, lack of competition from private parties due to uncertain requests to bid etc. 
which are all vitally important aspects of successful procurement and implementation of PPPs 
are connected with these not clear and insufficiently detailed guidelines, and competition 
enhancing procurement policy.  
The Korean PPP Act is a special Act that precedes other Acts, which means PPP projects 
are exempted from strict regulation in national property management. The details of 
implementation of the PPP Act is further elaborated through the PPP Act Enforcement Decrees, 
the Comprehensive National Basic Plan and various many guidelines and standard documents.  
For instance, the Draft Standard Concession Agreement for BTO Projects: Road Projects is alone 
around 109 pages, which means it is more voluminous than all the guidelines, documents and 
methodologies of Mongolia taken together. The following implementation Guidelines makes 
PPPs more foreseeable:  
- Guidelines for Value for Money (VFM) test  
- Guidelines for RFP (a Request for Proposal) preparation  
- Guidelines for Standard Output Specification by facility  
- Guidelines for Tender Evaluation  
- Guidelines for Standard Concession Agreement  
- Guidelines for Refinancing  
Specifically, a RFP in Korea is announced in a detailed and clear manner including 
estimated investment amount, duration, location, plan of the potential project, potential 
proceeds for the concessionaire, such as user fees and supplementary projects, and central and 
local government subsidies, such as the amount and the method of financial support etc. in 
order to give a clear understanding about a project (PPP Act, 2005). In contrast, a RFP of 
Mongolia is restrictively unclear no information on approximate amount of investment, the 
GOM supports etc. which undoubtedly is connected with the lack of ex ante estimations by the 
public sector.   
The Korean Government supports various monetary and other privileges such as granting 
of land expropriation rights to the concessionaire as well as selling national or public property in 
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designated areas to the concessionaire and allowing them to use it without charge or at lower 
prices for increasing the competition of the PPP market and reducing project costs. Also, 
Government may grant construction subsidy to the concessionaire, if it is necessary to maintain 
the user fee at a reasonable level (Jongyearn Lee, 2017). Former risk sharing scheme called 
Minimum Revenue Guarantee (MRG) was used at the beginning of the development of the PPPs 
market for attracting private parties extensively. However, due to criticisms about MRG, the 
Government abandoned it in 2008. Also, a very sophisticated mechanism for compensating the 
unsuccessful bidder for a certain portion of its cost is used for the purpose of promoting the 
competition. These are only some of the most important aspects of the Government supports 
and regulations. In sum, great many efforts at the policy, legal, institutional, operational and 
financial levels are devoted to make PPPs beneficial to all participants and to the society as a 
whole. 
It is said, the public sector shall be highly competent for making PPPs successful, if they 
would lack necessary competencies and resources, then PPP solutions cannot be beneficial, 
rather PPPs even could lead to fiscal damages (Budina et al., 2007). Indeed, the World Bank 
discovered a high level of contract renegotiation for PPP contracts in low and middle-income 
economies, especially the transportation and water sectors have been prone to renegotiation 
and recontracting with rates of as high as 55-75% (Graeme A Hodge et all., p.533, 2010).  
It is claimed that detailed standardized PPP models are important to reduce transaction 
costs and project risks. The Republic of Korea developed various sophisticated mechanisms and 
documents for eliminating transaction costs, project risks and increasing trusts. Also, for 
instance, Australia’s Victoria has developed various framework materials, documents including 
in a series of policy statements, guidelines, technical notes and advisory notes (Graeme p.407). 
These PPPs supporting materials are technically comprehensive with total over 1208 pages of 
guidelines (Graeme p.406). According to Jean-Etienne de Bettingnies and Thomas W. Ross if 
contracts are highly incomplete then that would trigger renegotiations at the later stages, thus, 
other solutions may offer better alternatives to avoid high bargaining costs such as if the tasks 
were allocated to the government (Graeme A Hodge et all., 2010).  
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In general, scholars claim that crafting PPP contracts that regulate concessionaire’s 
behavior over several decades is an extremally complex one and such contracts are prone to 
incompleteness thus could be risky to all parties (Graeme A Hodge et all., p.135, 2010). PPPs 
typically involve the bundling of multiple tasks in a large contractual agreement, the efficiency of 
such a complex contract is observable only to the private sector but not to the government 
(Graeme A Hodge et all., p.135, 2010). Consequently, Mongolia shall carefully consider its 
background capacity and potential for the development of a proper mid and long-term PPP 
policy since PPPs are highly complex, requires a highly capable human capacity and institutions 
and rules for which much government effort shall be put in advance before implementing PPPs 
at the massive scales.  
Fiscal framework analysis 
Let us see the Korean experiences of fiscal management related to PPPs. The Republic of 
Korea controls PPP related fiscal risks by requiring a clear framework for PPPs appraisals and a 
specific budgetary procedure for full long-term budgetary appropriations. In 1999 a new Public 
Investment Management (hereinafter referred to as PIM) started due to the financial crises of 
1997-1998. And, the Comprehensive Plan to Enhance Efficiency of Public Investment was 
formulated and intensified monitoring of project implementation process was introduced by the 
MOSF. A compulsory PFS was introduced for PPPs and the ownership of PFS was transferred to 
the MOSF from line ministries for an efficient financial management. Currently, a PFS is owned 
by the MOSF and managed by PIMAC at KDI. Although this is a short feasibility study of PPPs, it is 
so powerful starting point for better financial management that cannot be changed later 
(Jongyearn Lee, 2017). The MOSF does not review all projects of line ministries, but only certain 
projects that are financed from the Government.6 In that way, the MOSF is the main authority 
when it comes to huge infrastructure projects and no projects would be implemented out of the 
budget system. Mongolia currently tries to follow this mechanism of centralization of financial 
responsibility and authority at the ministry of finance, but in a distorted way. Moreover, various 
                                                 
6 All new large-scale projects with (1) TPC amounting to KRW 50 billion (about USD 50 million) or more and (2) 
central government subsidy greater than KRW 30 billion are subject to PFS. Local government and Public-Private 
Partnership (PPP) projects are also subject to PFS if central government subsidy exceeds KRW 30 billion. 
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other measures are used that further safeguard and prevent any possible fiscal problems due to 
PPPs in Korea. These are the following: 
- 2% rule - Limits government expenditure on PPPs to 2% of total estimated government 
annual expenditure  
- Aggregate ceiling on annual total amounts of PPP project (BTL) needs to be approved by 
the National Assembly.  
- Also for BTO contracts user fee is used effectively to share financial burden of the private 
and public sectors. 
 
The fiscal discipline for PPPs as a conventional procurement is the principle of budgeting 
of PPPs in Korea. Korea established a multistage and multi-party PPPs budget approval by 
promoting checks and balances between the National Assembly and the MOSF as well as by 
establishing the PRC review and approval at every important stage (Kangsoo Kim, 2017). 
Moreover, Chile’s PPP unit estimates the cost and risk of revenue guarantee and publishes 
information on contingent and direct liabilities under PPPs in annual reports on public finance 
and contingent liabilities (Kangsoo Kim, 2017).  
On the other hand, Mongolia faces fiscal risks, due to the inconsistency of PPPs planning 
with the budget since its implementation. The new Debt Management Law that was introduced 
in 2017 shall mange the Government debts, loans for the budget sustainability (Debt 
Management Law, 2017). It reflects the regulation of not only direct liabilities but also 
contingent liabilities that are reflected in the Concession Law such as MRG, currency risk related 
risks, government credit guarantees. Contingent liabilities shall be considered and shall be 
transparent to the public according to the Debt Management Law of Mongolia. The integrated 
debt database of the GOM debt and the GOM Debt Balance statement shall include information 
about contingent liabilities (Debt Management Law of Mongolia, 2017). The projects in the 
Concession List have to be accompanied with not only CBAs, but also with the 
financial/economic analysis that reflects risk assessment of contingent liabilities (Debt 
Management Law, Concession Law of Mongolia).  
Moreover, the Development Bank of Mongolia gives to concessionaires government 
credit guarantees. The New version of the Law of Mongolia on Development Bank was adopted 
in 2017 due to various drawbacks such as the lack of independence of the Bank from political 
oversight, the investment decision of the Bank have been not consistent with the national 
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financial and economic capability and potential, the measures of the M&E of the Bank is 
insufficiently reflected in the Law, the unqualified credit exceeded 50% etc. reasons (Approval of 
the Discussion of the Renewed Law of Mongolia on the Development Bank of Mongolia, 2017). 
According to the New Law, guarantees reflected in the Concession Law shall be given to a 
concessionaire if contingent liabilities, economic, environment and social impacts and analyses 
are made according to the relevant methodologies (The Renewed Debt Management Law, 2017). 
Consequently, according to the new fiscal regulation both direct (through CBAs) and contingent 
liabilities (through risk estimation) of PPPs shall be considered. But, still for instance for BTL 
types of projects additional safeguarding measures have to be taken since the government 
financial statement does not provide future payments (Kangsoo Kim, 2017).    
For instance, Korea has achieved to safeguard from the financial burden from BTL type of 
contracts at the National Assembly level and cumulative financial burdens of all PPPs through 2% 
Ceiling Rule. However, for Mongolia it might be better to implement financial safeguards that 
not rely on political discretions rather sophisticated PPPs accounting and reporting or a proper 
PPP expenditure ceiling might better suit. It is cautioned that definitional matters are extremely 
important for PPP accounting since enforcement of financial reporting and prevention from 
manipulation of PPP accounting depends on terminologies. It is suggested that, the PPP 
accounting shall follow the principle of ‘substance over form’ in order to penetrate behind the 
legal form to identify the economic substance of transactions (Graeme A Hodge et all., p.251, 
2010). For instance, in Mongolia one health concession that concerns the operation of hospital 
(ROT) was concluded so far. Although, the type of concession is not BTL or lease type, the 
concessionaire has to be continuously financed according to the same benchmark with the State 
integrated medical hospitals by the State. Consequently, Mongolia needs to make sure that their 
level of development of PPP accounting, reporting and financial management be suitable for 
endless types of PPPs, various flexible guarantees that are reflected and not reflected in the 
Concession Law of Mongolia. 
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Conclusions and recommendations  
A summary of context-specific causes of failures of PPPs in Mongolia  
Three context-specific causes of failures could be highlighted based on previous sections, 
namely an ambiguous PPP concept, the unaccountable public sector, and uncompetitive private 
sector.  
- The flexibility and ambiguity of the PPP concept is not balanced against its 
accountability and efficiency  
With regards to the PPP concept, types, applicable infrastructures and so on, the whole 
PPP concept has been manipulated in practice due to its flexibility and ambiguity and the nature 
of PPPs that makes them prone to rents. This distortion has enabled PPPs to be used in a socio-
economically unbalanced way. In addition, the lack of short and long-term policies related to 
PPPs and lack of proper risk-sharing mechanisms have negatively influenced the promotion of 
PPPs in an efficiently allocative way.  
Moreover, according to the political preferences, the flexibility of the PPP concept has 
enabled politicians to shift the base of PPP Unit, 5 times during the period from 2010 to 2017. 
Also, current measures to promote PPP policy decentralization and financial centralization policy, 
are likely to fail due to the lack of a checks-and-balances mechanism, other necessary PPPs 
accounting measures as well as insufficient expertise of the human resources in the line 
ministries and a lack of PPP-related guiding documents.  
Furthermore, artificial procurement, management, economic analysis, competition, and 
in general, illegitimate partnerships and PPP implementation processes have been promoted in 
Mongolia. A lack of legal and policy clarity, as well as institutional stability have confirmed the 
formality rather than quality of PPP implementation.  This distorted PPP implementation process 
would be deepened due to the new policy, which legally excludes integrated policy, capacity 
building, research concerning PPPs and so on.  
Consequently, the Mongolian experience has shown evidence that just a little bit of 
maneuvering space in the PPP concept is enough to lead to massive political opportunism and 
fiscal instabilities. The flexible PPP concept has been manipulated at all stages i.e. policy, legal, 
institutional, financial and operational stages of the PPP system. In Mongolia, impreciseness and 
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a flexible PPP concept has helped to implement PPP projects in a distorted way, shift the PPP 
Unit as required according to political preferences, affect the budgeting system and result in 
artificial PPP processes.  
Here, the role of the legal system is vital to promote preciseness and accountability that 
would clarify the concept and prevent it from possible abuses. Korea has successfully achieved 
PPP policy clarity through its sophisticated legal rules and multi-layer and multi-stakeholder 
mutual checking and balancing mechanism which has made it more accountable and 
transparent. 
Many scholars have been expressing their skeptical viewpoints on PPPs, which have been 
based on unimpressive PPP experiences in developing countries. For instance, Paul Noumba-Um 
says “…the World Bank and IMFs face a ‘PPP paradox’ in the sense that they need to strike a 
sensible balance between forceful advocacy for PPPs and effective management of client 
countries’ expectations of what can be achieved through PPPs” (Graeme A Hodge et all., p.456, 
2010). As for Mongolia, the flexible PPP concept has been easily manipulated in an immature 
institutional, legal and social environment. Thus, it could be seen that the main cause of PPPs 
failures there is driven by the failure of balancing the ambiguity of the PPP concept against its 
efficiency and clarity.  
- The lack of political will to nurture genuine partnership and lack of capability in the 
public sector 
The current practice of Mongolia is to train a few specialists for carrying out the PPP 
system. Subsequently, they have to further train staff of other public organizations who would 
then determine their respective preferred PPPs, types and prioritize their PPPs according to the 
national development policy. Everybody does work as they consider, given the wide discretion 
and no one is responsible for the outcomes of their decisions. If Mongolia still wishes to pursue 
PPPs on a massive scale, capacity-building for PPPs should be an important sub-policy of the 
overall PPP policy. Importantly, an accountability mechanism based on performance indicators 
backed up by enforcement measures should be an inseparable part of any responsibilities and 
performance of public sector staffs (Dani Rodrik, 2008). In Mongolia, there has been no 
accountability mechanism in place to make the public as well as the private sectors effectively 
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accountable for their insufficient performances. Mongolian experience shows that, if an 
accountability mechanism based on clear performance indicators followed by enforcement 
measures, could not be implemented, then PPPs might do more harm than benefit. Basically, 
that necessitates an in-depth reform of the public sector in Mongolia (Graeme A Hodge et all., 
2010). 
Indeed, Colin F. Duffield claims that it is critical to consider not only the strategy to 
procure assets but also the specific contextual, cultural, political and country variants that 
together influence the choice and style of procurement (Graeme A Hodge et all., 2010). For 
instance, the level of maturity that is necessary for PPP implementation has required substantial 
development, cultural reforms and up-skilling of both public and private sectors in East 
European countries. In addition to the maturing of the market, governments have also 
undertaken reforms and enhancement of policies, legal and legislative matters, taxation and 
their own project organizational structures (Graeme A Hodge et all., p.209, 2010). Therefore, a 
proper political will and proactive public sector reform and advancement are required from 
Mongolia to make PPPs there, properly workable.  
- The uncompetitive private sector and immature environment 
As the Korean experience shows, an effective government support for private parties to 
participate and compete actively in the provision of public infrastructures, has been the key to 
nurturing the competitive PPP market with strong private players.  
However, promoting the private sector has various problems in Mongolia. Not only is 
there the lack of financial resources, but also in many cases, beneficiaries would already be 
competitive MNCs or powerful foreign companies due to the globalized PPP market. Even if the 
domestic private sector does get supports, it does not guarantee the development of the 
competitive PPP market internally. Currently, the domestic private sector is not only not 
competitive, but also under-educated concerning PPPs and PPP-related business possibilities 
such as in coordinating and creating a SPV and participating in PPP tendering. In a globalized 
world, the PPP market in Mongolia might not develop in a balanced way due to underdeveloped 
Mongolian domestic companies and the high gaps in technology, knowledge and know-how of 
foreign companies and domestic companies. If Mongolia would mostly rely on foreign 
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companies for infrastructure development, then many public infrastructure might be provided 
by foreign companies. In Mongolia, two huge BOT concession contracts have been concluded 
with foreign companies with the duration of 30 years (except for short-term BT type contracts 
that involved foreign companies). One example is the biggest combined heat and power plant 
and the other is the 542-km railway base structure that would connect Mongolia with the 
Russian Federation and the Republic of China.  
Thus, in certain cases, it is possible to link PPP policy to development and social policies, 
since in PPP terms, concession items concern public goods. These topics are beyond this thesis 
content, since these issues require more extensive empirical and normative analyses. One thing 
that needs to be highlighted here is that the PPP system is highly complex, uncertain and 
dynamic and concerns issues regarding equality, disparity, public interest, development and so 
on - so this field should be developed in a more specific, considerate manner, especially in 
Mongolia (OECD, 2009). However, currently, the pattern of PPP development in Mongolia is 
quite technical in terms of institution and rules ‘copying’ in a distorted way from developed 
countries and international standards with the main emphasis on reducing infrastructure gaps. 
Indeed, lately various literatures and court cases that touch upon the public interest aspects of 
PPPs have been growing and confirming the importance of reinforcing the mechanisms for 
protection of public interest aspects in the use of PPPs.  
Also, many Latin American countries have abandoned concession type of PPPs to some 
extent due to public interest-related issues (OECD, 2009; World Bank, 2004, 2009). It has been 
suggested that, “…PPPs have to have a specific public interest test that assesses factors including 
effectiveness, accountability, and transparency, equity, public access, consumer rights, security, 
privacy, and rights of representation of affected individuals and communities…” (Graeme A 
Hodge et all, 2010). 
On the other hand, the issue of promotion of competition in a developed country like 
Korea is totally different. With more competition from MNCs or outside, the domestic 
companies would become more and more competitive. In other words, competition at the PPP 
market in developed countries would only benefit the private, public sectors and the society as a 
whole through competition and innovation.  Korea has successfully nurtured the capable public 
78 
 
sector, competitive private players and clear institutions and rules for PPP’s implementation. 
The current sophistication of PPP policy directions are efficiently resolving the allocation of rules 
with SOEs and PPPs; reducing and resolving disputes between public and private sectors 
(developing general and specific guidelines, creation of a centralized disputes database, etc.); 
diversifying financing sources (expanding investment trusts etc.); expanding to overseas PPP 
markets and others (exporting PPP systems, linking ODA and PPPs, etc.) (Kangsoo Kim, 2017).  
Consequently, the private sector promotion strategy in the field of PPP might need to be 
differently regulated specifically in Mongolia due to various context-specific social and economic 
considerations that might result in unintended outcomes, specifically since PPPs concern public 
infrastructures. Currently, Mongolia’s procurement is ‘against’ competition and against the 
creation of competitive private parties and more importantly, the public interest aspect might 
be imbalanced against the economic aspects of PPPs. In such an environment, the rationale of a 
PPP policy of innovation and efficiency through competition for increased social welfare would 
not be reached yet in Mongolia.  
The main implications of a clear and accountable institutional development, and 
competitive private and public sectors are to ensure the long-term completeness of contracts 
and to minimize uncertainty. PPP contracts are complex and the economic consequences of 
contractual incompleteness could be huge for Mongolia. Specifically, based on the current 
practice of Mongolia, it is highly possible that various disputes could arise due to highly possible 
incomplete contracts that do not reflect precise agreed prices, tolls, government payments and 
the like. Moreover, conflicts could concern many things such as ownership (local or central), 
total project costs (If changes occur), interpretation order of legal documents, financing through 
project finance, construction period delay, inflation and calculation of project costs, force 
majore and other similar events. (Kangsoo Kim, 2017). Therefore, it is important to improve the 
dispute resolution mechanism. For example, the PIMAC of Korea provides capacity-building 
programs to public officials, develops standards concession contracts and other policy 
documents and guidelines to prevent and minimize possible disputes and uncertainties. Korea 
has also established the PPP Project Dispute Mediation Committee consisting of representatives 
from the government, project company, and representatives of public, under the direct 
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jurisdiction of the MOSF in 2011 (Kangsoo Kim, 2017). The decision of the Committee is binding 
for the government body, whereas the private party has the right to decide whether to use and 
accept the Committee’s decision (Kangsoo Kim, 2017). In Korea, it is considered necessary to 
develop specific and general dispute resolution guidelines, as well as establish centralized 
disputes databases, which could also be relevant for Mongolia’s use (Kangsoo Kim, 2017).  
It was suggested that a PPP procurement strategy solely on the basis of economic 
pressure is unjustifiable since “…a lack of competition, a lack of technical innovation, poor 
transparency or inappropriate risk allocation may all lead to suboptimal contractual outcomes…” 
(Graeme A Hodge et all, p.98, 2010).  In line with that, Duddied cautions that all PPPs have 
strengths and weaknesses and these may well apply to only a minority7 of projects (Graeme A 
Hodge et all., p.601, 2010). 
The PPP policy of Mongolia has been transplanted from developed countries, who have 
created their rules that are suitable for their level of socio-economic contexts. So, Mongolia as a 
‘rule copier’ needs to make PPPs rules suitable to their own level of socio-economic 
development. Three basic differences, namely the unaccountable public sector, uncompetitive 
private sector, and an ambiguous PPP concept need to be properly addressed in order to 
appropriately promote a proper PPPs system which is likely to be harder to achieve for a 
developing country like Mongolia where accountability and embeddedness are absent. 
Conclusions and recommendations   
The following table concludes and summarizes the main findings based on a comparative 
study. Following that, recommendations and action plans for a better PPPs policy are given.  
Table 16 A summary table of the main findings 
Factors/countries Republic of Korea Mongolia 
Legal/policy frameworks 
Relevant 
laws/policies 
Precise and stabile Ambiguous and unstable  
Eligible Infrastructure 
types 
Positive listing that promotes clarity 
(Article 2, PPP Law) 
Negative listing that enables flexibility 
for manipulation (Article3, Concession 
Law) 
PPPs types Clearly indicated PPPs types of BTO and 
BTL (Article 4, PPP Law) 
No clearly preferred PPPs types and 
definition of a wide variety of PPPs types 
                                                 
7  Hart concludes that PPPs may be optimal when building quality can be well specified and ‘corner-cutting’ 
investments are relatively easy to monitor, because in that case both over-investment in corner-cutting and under-
investment in building are relatively low (Graeme A Hodge et all., p.147, 2010). 
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that create confusion and manipulation 
(Article 4, Concession Law) 
Short and long-term 
PPPs planning 
Sophisticated short and long- term PPPs 
coherent planning that promotes 
balanced development (Article 7, 8, PPP 
Act; Comprehensive National Basic Plan, 
2011) 
Lack of proper and coherent planning of 
PPPs that promotes allocative 
inefficiency (Concession List, 2013; 
Concession Law) 
Risk sharing  
- Protection of 
public interest 
- Support of 
private sector 
Government shares risks to the extent 
to protect the public interest and 
support the private sector (Article 47, 
PPP Act; Chapter Part II, V, 
Comprehensive National Basic Plan, 
2011) 
No balanced and clear risk sharing 
mechanism for the protection of public 
interest and the support of private 
sector (Concluded concession contracts 
in the Annex I, Concession Law) 
Institutional framework 
Institutional clarity, 
stability and mutual 
check and balance 
mechanism  
Clear designation of institutions in the 
PPP Law such as the MOSF, Project 
Review Committee, PIMAC, the National 
Assembly with respective 
responsibilities that are stable, that 
could make coherent and coordinated 
decisions and that mutually check and 
balance (Article 2, 5, 23, PPP Act).   
Lack of clarity about the location and 
affiliation of the PPP Unit have 
combined to move around the Unit 5 
times according to the political 
preferences during 2010-2017 (Article 
6.2, Concession Law). The current 
institutional change, namely financial 
centralization at the MOF and 
management decentralization approach 
lacks to promote projects’ reviews and 
an integrated PPPs policy (Amendment 
Law of Concession Law) 
Procurement framework  
Competitive 
procurement  
Various target policies are implemented 
for increasing competitive tendering and 
efficient procurement process 
Competition discouraging tendering and 
artificially legitimized procurement 
practices  
Special privileges to 
PPPs 
Designation of the PPP Law as a Special 
Act that has a priority over other acts 
(Article 3, PPP Act) 
No special status of the Concession Law; 
various privileges are reflected in the 
Concession Law and are given on a 
contract basis (Concluded concession 
contracts in the Annex I, Concession 
Law) 
Government 
supports 
Provision of various Government 
supports such as land acquisition costs, 
construction subsidy, exceptions from 
taxes, unitary payment for BTL and so 
on, in order to increase competition and 
decrease project costs, eventually the 
fees for the public (Articles 4, 17-20, 53, 
PPP Law; Chapter II, Comprehensive 
National Basic Plan, 2011)  
Although, the Concession Law reflects 
various kinds of supports, to date no 
real monetary subsidies have been 
granted. Support has been directed to 
the creation of an excellent business 
environment through granting of 
monopoly rights, all the necessary 
permissions, grants, licenses, 
government credit guarantees, purchase 
of products and so on (Concluded 
concession contracts in the Annex I; 
Chapter 7, Concession Law) 
Compensation of 
unsuccessful tenders 
Compensation for unsuccessful tenders 
(Article 7, Enforcement Decree) 
No applicable mechanism 
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Tendering and RFPs Detailed and clear RFPs that increase 
participation and competition (Article 
10, 11, PPP Act) 
Unclear RFPs that discourage 
participation and competition (Article 
13, Concession Law) 
Guidelines and 
sample documents  
Various many kinds of guidelines and 
documents have been developed and 
updated timely manner to increase 
transparency, accountability, trust, 
clarity and decrease uncertainty, 
asymmetry of information of the whole 
PPP procurement process (PPP Act, 
Enforcement Decree; Comprehensive 
National Basic Plan, 2011) 
Insufficient, improper guidelines that 
have been not updated properly and 
that could not promote clarity and 
decrease asymmetry of information for 
the increased participation and 
competition of the private sector 
(Concession Law)  
Fiscal framework 
Institutional check 
and balance 
A multi-stage and multi-party PPPs 
budget approval by promoting checks 
and balances between the National 
Assembly, the MOSF, the PRC (for review 
and approval at every important stage), 
PIMAC (for review and evaluation of 
solicited/unsolicited projects) and line 
ministries have been created (Article 2, 
5, 23, PPP Act; Articles 20 Enforcement 
Decree; Chapter V, Basic Plan)  
Although a financial centralization policy 
at the MOF for better fiscal 
sustainability has been approved, no 
check and review mechanism has been 
created yet. No reviewing mechanism of 
the appropriateness of CBAs of line 
ministries/local governments as well as 
no check and balance mechanism of the 
MOF, GOM and the Parliament 
Other safeguarding 
measures such as BTL 
aggregate ceiling, 
cumulative PPPs 
expenditure ceiling, 
ceiling of guarantees 
and so on  
2% rule limits government expenditure 
on PPP to 2% of total estimated 
government annual expenditure; 
Aggregate ceiling on BTL needs to be 
approved by the National Assembly and  
ceiling of the credit Guarantees are also 
regulated (Articles 7-2, -3, PPP Act; 
Article 5-2, 29, Enforcement Decree of 
the PPP Act) 
No proper, clear cut and reliable fiscal 
safeguarding mechanisms that are 
suitable for too many types of PPPs, and 
that are suitable to limit a wide 
discretion of the GOM and the 
Parliament of Mongolia (Article 6, 
Concession Law, Budget Law) 
 
Recommendations  
Conceptual, policy and legal frameworks  
 Need to clarify all confusions that create opportunistic spaces for manipulation such as the 
PPP concept, PPP type, PPP applicable infrastructures, PPP risk sharing, the lack of clarity on 
the issue of public interest in PPPs, PPP analysis, the private sector is the best approach and 
so on. In general, reform the PPP legal environment and policies to address ambiguity  
 The GOM needs to take responsibility and share PPP financing risks in order to retain the 
public interest aspects in PPPs and promote a socio-economically balanced PPPs 
 Need to define both short and long-term PPP policies and integrated implementation of PPPs 
based on policy priorities and fiscal possibilities; Need to adopt integrated PPP policy, plan 
based on necessary researches 
Institutional framework  
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 Need to create an arm’s length independent, stable review mechanism that reviews CBAs of 
line ministries/local/central governments for better accountability. Need to create a multi-
layered and multi-stakeholder check and balance mechanism for PPPs 
 Need to create an efficient institution that conducts PPPs related researches and guidelines, 
standard documents; and that assists all government organizations for methodological and 
expert matters 
Procurement framework 
 Need to develop a sub policy for human capacity building for PPPs of the public sector 
 Need to embed the accountability mechanism within public and private sectors, at all levels 
and aspects and based on clear performance indicators backed up proper enforcement 
measures 
 Need to adopt clear competition enhancing procurement policy and need to educate the 
private sector for their active participation  
Fiscal and financial framework 
 Although many PPPs related fiscal and financial measures have been taken due to the 
current fiscal problems, these measures might be not easily implementable due to the 
complexity of measures and human resources issues. Thus, simpler, cross cut, and more 
safeguarding measures such as a general ceiling approach for PPPs and for lease type of 
contracts and so on, that are suitable to prevent the manipulation of the flexible PPP 
concept and a wide discretion of government authorities need to be developed 
 Need to reform PPPs accounting, reporting, audits, transparency and disclosure mechanisms 
for better accountability  
Action Plan for PPP policy reform 
 Invalidate and cancel the Concession list that holds about 70% of BT type of contracts and 53% 
of direct contracting type of contracts. Readopt it based on reformulated policies that reflect 
the necessity and fiscal possibility without predefining the procurement type 
 Reformulate the detailed PPP policy and regulatory framework all together based on 
countries needs and financial possibilities 
 Adopt the transition policy that enable Mongolia to shift from the ‘artificial PPP system’ to 
‘correct PPP system’ by properly developing rules, institutions, accountability mechanisms, 
procurement policies, guidelines, standard contracts, and by preparing the necessary human 
capacity 
 Promote academics, scholars and the media to be the ‘controllers’ of PPPs through provision 
of on time and full PPPs related information 
 The GOM should have an active communication strategy with the citizens due to possible 
incomplete contracts that might create negative public attitudes as well as with the private 
sector for promotion of accountability and competitiveness  
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 Need to develop a dispute settlement policy for efficiency and transparency 
 Need to reflect contract renegotiation specifications to prevent risks and massive 
renegotiation occasions  
 
If Mongolia is unable to implement at least these minimum measures for the establishment 
of a proper PPP system, opportunistic behaviors and inefficient PPPs would continue to be the 
practice in Mongolia. Eventually, if it is unable to, the PPP system of Mongolia might follow the 
experiences of many Latin American countries who have abandoned the concession system due 
to the lack of accountability, transparency, embeddedness and the sufficient consideration of 
the public interest in their concessions.  
Limitations 
 
 This paper analyses the current PPP policy, mainly consideration of the public interest 
within PPPs of Mongolia from a developing country perspective. Thus, the paper basically 
describes policy, legal, institutional, operational and fiscal flaws and proposes a limited number 
of ‘must-have’ policy recommendations for a better PPP policy. This paper leaves many open 
and unanswered important questions such as other better options of provision of public 
infrastructures that better suit socio-economic development of Mongolia; the impact of mixing 
of industrial and PPP policy; a proper user fee policy and so on in Mongolia since these issues 
require more in-depth empirical and normative analyses. However, it is expected that with this 
paper, the most important key deficiencies of the PPP system of Mongolia could be amended 
and improved. 
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ANNEX I A detailed list of signed agreements as of 2017, retrieved from the web page of the National Development Agency 
№ Concession name Year of 
contac
ts 
Concession types Dura
tion  
Guarantee  
duration 
Government support Procur
ement 
type8 
BT BOT BOO/  
others9 
  Infrastructure, Building 
1 Mining, Metallurgy Complex 2014 Renovate-BOT, BT 30 30 Typical10 (mining licenses11 etc.) DC 
2 Human development complex center 2014 - BOT - 30 5 years after 
the contract 
completion 
Not to give permission to build similar function 
complexes and to provide similar services within 
the area to any state related 
organizations/companies 
DC 
3 The State reserve /fuel/ warehouse at 
Rashaant 
2015 - - BOO 30 30 years Typical, lease of the warehouse DC 
Electricity 
4 Tuul Songino water reserve complex 2014 - - BOO 23 23 years Typical DC 
5 Telmen thermal power station 2013 - BOT - 22 22 years Typical, stabilization of coal prices DC 
6 Fifth combined heat and power plant  2014 - - DFBOM 25 25 years Typical, guaranteed revenues, compensation 
amounts, other commitments 
CT 
7 Egiin river hydropower station 2015 BT   - 3 years Typical, Pay back USD 98,316,328 /2 years/ DC 
8 Power station, electricity transmission 
line at Uvs aimag 
2016 - - DFBOT 30 30 years Typical DC 
  Paved roads and transportation 
9 Nariinsukhait-Shiveehuren-paved 
road 
2011 - BOT - 17 17 years Typical - 
10 Altai-Darvi 165 km paved road 2015 BT - - - 3 years Typical; Bay back CNY 569,049,587,0 /4 years/ CT 
11 Altai-Darvi 98 km paved road 2015 BT - - - 3 years Typical; Bay back CT 
                                                 
8 Direct contracting (DC); Competitive tendering (CT) 
9 Design-financing-build-operation-maintenance (DFBOM); Design-build-own-operate DBOO; Design-buils-operate-transfer (DBOT) Design-Demolish-Build-Transfer 
(DDBT 
10 An import of equipment and materials support; a support for giving a work permission for foreign workforce; a support for giving various rights, permissions such as 
land use right, permissions/licenses to use water, electricity, heating, communication; also all other necessary collaborations from government regulating authorities 
shall be provided in timely and promptly ways without any delays. In the most electricity, heating i.e. vital public services contracts the GOM ensures buying agreed 
amounts of electricity/heating and so on from concessionaries.   
11 The right to mine Khust mountain, Tumur tolgoi, Tumurtei mining sites for the mining and manufacturing of iron ore and iron ore concentrates. 
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CNY 377,554,752.0 /4 years/ 
12 To Mandal 15.8 km paved road 2015 BT - - - 3 years Typical; Pay back USD 6,473,735.0 /3 years/ CT 
13 Bayankhongor-Altai 126.7 km paved 
road 
2015 BT -  - 3 years Typical; Pay back USD 76,963,494.0 /3 years/ CT 
14 To Aglag Buteeliin Monster 6.2 km 
paved road 
2015 BT - - - 3 years Typical; Pay back 6,952,033.901.0 /one year/ DC 
15 Dashinchilin to Murun 120 km paved 
road 
2016 BT   - 3 years Typical; Pay back 
USD 77,480,229.0 /2019-2022, 4 years/ 
CT 
16 A Bridge construction at Selenge 
aimag 
2016 - - DBT 
 
- 3 years  Typical; Pay back 
MNT1,949,888,978.0 /2 years 2017, 2018/ 
CT 
17 Galt soum of Khuvsgul aimag-Floating 
bridge 
2016 - - DBT  - 3 years Typical; Pay back MNT 787500000.0 /2 years 
2017, 2018/ 
CT 
18 To connect Altanbulag soum with 
clean water through pipelines 
2015 BT - - - 3 years Typical Pay back MNT400,000,000.0 /within 4 
months/ 
DC 
Railway 
19 Railway base structure between 
Erdenet and Ovoot mine 
2015 - - DBOT 30 30 years Typical, assistances and supports related to 
financiers’ requirements; a pre-emptive right to 
implement the Expansion of the Base Structure  
DC 
  Health 
20 Building of an incomplete hospital 
/260 beds/ 
2015 - - ROT 25 25 years Almost a built building DC 
Culture, sports and tourism  
21 Mongolian Nationality Museum 2015 - - DBOO 20 20 years Transfer of all exhibitions  DC 
Education /cumulative/ 
+1
8 
The rest of the 18 concessions concern building or extension 
of schools and kindergartens and one concern sport and 
cultural complex.  
All concessions were concluded in 2016. 
Below are given a few examples for reflecting the repayment 
condition. 
All of them are BT types. 
However, in the capital city 
design, demolish and build, 
transfer type was used which is 
quite a same type with BT 
except demolishing. 
Typical 
The GOM should pay back investments generally 
after two to three years of completion of projects 
/2016-2019/. 
All are 
DC 
- Bayangol district-38 Secondary school Design-Demolish-Build-
Transfer 
In total USD 6,705,790.0 or MNT 13,463,080,467.2 
2017-USD 2,514,671.0; 2018-USD 4,191,119.0 
- Bayanzurkh district 14 Secondary school  Design-Demolish-Build-
Transfer  
In total MNT 10,787,000,000.0 
2016-MNT 2,900,000,000.0; 2017-MNT 7,887,000,000.0 
- School, Tsagaan-Uul soum of Khuvsgul Aimag BT Pay back within two years after the completion of the project. The amount 
is not applicable in the contract. 
 
